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I. INTRODUCTION

In May 2001, we published an article entitled Quiet Rebellion? Explaining
Nearly a Decade of Declining Federal Drug Sentences' ("Rebellion I'), which
explores the reasons for the persistent decline throughout the 1990s in the
average sentence imposed in federal court for narcotics violations. We were
intrigued by the fact that although federal drug sentences rose sharply in the
years immediately following the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of
19842 and the resultant adoption of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
("Guidelines") in 1987, starting in roughly 1991-1992, federal drug
sentences commenced a steady decline that continued through the year
2000. According to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
(AO), the average federal drug sentence rose from 65.7 months in 1984, to
its all-time high of 95.7 months in 1991. 3 However, in the eight years
between 1991 and 1999, AO statistics show that the average federal prison
sentence for a drug offender decreased from 95.7 months to 74.6 months: a
drop of 22%, or nearly two years per defendant. 4 United States Sentencing
Commission statistics report a somewhat less precipitous, but still
unmistakable, seven-year decline in the average drug sentence from a high
of 88.2 months in 1992, to 75.2 months in 1999: a drop of 14.7%. 5
1. Frank 0. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion? ExplainingNearly a Decade of
DediningFederalDrugSentences,86 IOWAL. REV. 1043 (2001).
2. Pub. L. No. 98-473,98 Stat. 1987 (1984).
3. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, NATIONAL PROFILE AND ENFORCEMENT TRENDS
OVER TIME, at http://trac.syr.edu/tracdea/findings/national/druppri8199.htm (last visited
Nov. 28, 2001) (on file with the Iowa Law Review) [hereinafter TRAC study]. The AO has not yet
reported sentencing statistics for the year 2000.
4. Id.
5. The United States Sentencing Commission figures for the years 1992 through 1998
appear in the TRAC study, supranote 3. The average drug sentence reported by the U.S. Sentencing Commission for 1999 is from the Commission's 1999 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS 32, fig.E (2000) [hereinafter 1999 SOURCEBOOK].
These United States Sentencing Commission figures represent the mean prison sentence imposed on federal narcotics offenders who were actually sentenced to prison. Cases in
which probation-only sentences (i.e., probationary sentences with no prison term, even if they
included some form of home or community confinement) were imposed are not included. The
number of such sentences ranged from 9% of the total number of defendants convicted on
drug charges in 1992 See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT [hereinafter 1992 ANNUAL REPORT] (1993), at 60 tbl.20, to 5.8% in 1999; 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra, at
28 tbl.12. If probationary sentences are included in the average drug sentence calculation as
zero months of imprisonment, the yearly averages are slightly lower. For example, according to
our calculations using Sentencing Commission data, the mean drug sentence in 1999 would be
roughly 73 months, id. at 29 tbl.13, rather than roughly 75 months. The TRAC study, supra note
3, states that if straight-probation sentences were included, the average drug sentence reported
in 1999 by the AO would drop from 74.6 months to approximately 69 months. Regardless, the
overall downward trend remains the same.
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Sentencing Commission statistics released after the publication of Rebellion I
show that the average drug sentence continued to drop in 2000 to 74.4
months.6
In Rebellion I, we examined national statistics for the federal courts in an
effort to answer three questions. First, is the decline in the length of federal
drug sentences since 1991-1992 "real"? That is, has the decline been
sufficiently sustained in duration and pronounced in magnitude that one
can be confident it represents a meaningful trend, rather than a mere
random statistical fluctuation? Second, assuming that the decline is "real," to
what degree can it be attributed to "non-discretionary factors"? We defined
non-discretionary factors as changes in statutory or sentencing guidelines
law, alterations in the mix of criminal cases brought to the federal system, or
other considerations that are outside of the range of discretionary choice
available to individual federal prosecutors, defense attorneys, probation
officers, and district judges handling individual federal drug cases.7 Third, to
what degree can the decrease in federal drug sentences be attributed to
"discretionary factors," that is, to evolutionary changes in the way sentencing
actors such as prosecutors, defense lawyers, judges, and probation officers
exercise their discretion in individual cases? s
We concluded that the decrease in average federal drug sentence
length throughout the 1990s was indeed real. We also concluded that at
least some of the decrease is attributable to "non-discretionary" causes.
Finally, we concluded that the downward trend in drug sentence length
since 1991-1992 cannot be entirely explained on non-discretionary grounds.
Rather, the continuing downward movement is, to a significant degree, the
product of an array of discretionary choices by judges, prosecutors, defense
counsel, and probation officers. As we wrote in Rebellion I:
Although we are unable to perform a regression analysis that would
quantify precisely the relative effect of each of the various factors,
viewed in the aggregate, the evidence we have reviewed shows the
following: (1) at virtually every point in the Guidelines sentencing
process where prosecutors and judges can exercise discretionary
authority to reduce drug sentences, they have done so; and (2)
where we can measure trends, the trend since roughly 1992 has
6.
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2000 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS 32 fig.E (2001) [hereinafter 2000 SOURCEBOOKI].
7. Bowman & Heise, supranote 1, at 1067.
8. The list of discretionary factors considered in Rebellion I included the choice to enter
into a plea agreement, i& at 1103-07, acceptance of responsibility rates, id.
at 1105-07, the position of imposed sentences within the applicable Guideline range, id.at 1107-08, the award of
upward and downward departures, id.at 1108-18, charge bargaining, id.at 1119-22, and fact
bargaining, id. at 1122-24.
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always been toward exercising discretion in favor of leniency with
increasing frequency. 9
Our first article necessarily left some questions unanswered. For
example, we looked only at national data that aggregated information on
drug sentences from every federal district. Therefore, we were unable to
determine whether there might be local or regional phenomena that either
magnified or dampened the broad national downward trend. The existence
of regional variation in drug sentencing patterns would be of significance
not only to empirical inquiry into the decline in federal drug sentence
length, but also to the larger question of the success of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines in eliminating, or at the least reducing, unwarranted
sentencing disparity.
Likewise, while we were able to arrive at compelling conclusions
regarding the discretionary mechanisms employed by sentencing actors to
effect the gradual reduction in federal drug sentences, our discussion of the
motives for this behavior was far more tentative. We examined national data
on Assistant U.S Attorney caseload and judicial caseload, but found little
support in those figures for the proposition that caseload pressures have
driven the drug sentence decline. 0 We also suggested that among the
reasons for the drug sentence decrease might be a widespread perception
among judges, lawyers, and probation officers "that the federal narcotics
sentences generated by a scrupulous adherence to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines and the mandatory minimum sentencing statutes are often, if not
always, too high, or at the least are higher than necessary to achieve the
institutional objectives of the system's front line actors.""
After completing the first article, we surmised that local and regional
data might enhance our understanding of motive as well as mechanism. For
example, although caseload figures at the national level provide little
support for the hypothesis that prosecutors have needed to give increased
sentencing discounts to move defendants through the system, 12 some
individual districts might have experienced caseload increases that created
pressures to offer leniency to expedite case processing. 13 Consequently, we
decided to refine the analysis of declining federal drug sentences contained
9. Id. at 1126.
10. Id. at 1127-29.
11. Id. at 1132. We also noted that the onset of the decline corresponded roughly with the
transition from the Bush Administration to the Clinton Administration, but could only speculate about the effect this might have had. Id. at 1129-S0. We offer neither data nor additional
speculation on this point in the present Article.
12. Id. at 1127-28.
13. For example, in Rebellion I, we observed that sentencing patterns in districts along the
Mexican border deserved more detailed analysis. Id. at 1128 n.351. We provide such analysis
here. See infra Part II.B.3 and accompanying text (analyzing sentencing patterns along the U.S.Mexican border).
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in our first article by adding an examination of available drug sentencing
data at the district and circuit level. Unfortunately, data on many of the
factors we examined at the national level were not readily available on a
district-by-district basis. 14 However, there was sufficient information to
address a number of key points, including whether the decline in national
average drug sentence was experienced uniformly across the country,
whether any observed local variations were associated with variables such as
district size or population density, whether local variations were associated
with changes in the mix of drug types prosecuted in a district, and whether
declines in the average drug sentence within a district correlated with
changes in judicial or prosecutorial workload. After analyzing the data, we
have reached the following conclusions:
First, in 2000, the average federal drug sentence continued to decline,
although there are some indications that the decline is finally bottoming
out.
Second, while the national average drug sentence trended steadily
downward from 1992 to 1999, at the district and circuit level there was a
remarkable degree of variation in both sentence length and change in
average sentence length. For example, in 1992, the average drug sentence
within a district ranged from 22 months to 176 months, 5 and forty-one of
the ninety-four judicial districts actually had higher average drug sentences
in 1999 than in 1992.16

Third, our district-based regression analyses viewed in conjunction with
a re-examination of national descriptive data have caused us to modify our
earlier conclusion that changes in the mix of drug types prosecuted in
federal courts did not contribute to the decline in average drug sentence
between 1992 and 1999. It now appears that, all else being equal, changes in
drug type would have increased drug sentences from 1992-1996, but may
have contributed to the decline in average drug sentence between 1996 and
1999, largely because of events in the five judicial districts along the Mexican
border.
Fourth, neither population density nor district size as expressed by the
number of Assistant United States Attorneys employed by the district shows a
statistically significant relationship to the increase or decrease of the average
drug sentence within a district.
14. District level data on all the points we considered in Rebellion Iare publicly available in
the sense that the U.S. Sentencing Commission has placed its annual databases in public repositories. However, these databases are so large and unwieldy that an attempt to refine and manipulate the information on the 15-20,000 drug cases sentenced annually from 1992-2000 into
usable district level data on all the points we considered in Rebellion I was impractical. For a
more complete discussion of the data analyzed and methods employed in this Article, see infra
notes 258-73 and accompanying text.
15. Infra note 247 and accompanying text.
16. Infra note 244 and accompanying text.

HeinOnline -- 87 Iowa L. Rev. 482 2001-2002

REBELUONIH
Fifth, increases in prosecutorial workload correlate consistently with
decreases in drug sentence length, but oddly, increases in judicial workload
demonstrate virtually no such relationship.
Finally, our basic conclusions in Rebellion I-that the decline of federal
drug sentences in the 1990s was real and that the decline was in significant
part attributable to discretionary choices by front line sentencing actorsremain unchanged, except insofar as our new findings suggest that events in
the Mexican border districts exerted particular influence from 1996-1999.
H. REVIEW AND UPDATE OF THE FINDINGS

OF REBELLONI

This section explains the approach and findings of our first Article.
Where possible, we have added and analyzed data for the years 1992 and
2000 not available to us at the time the first article was published. For
reasons of space, we have omitted introductory material on the history and
structure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines generally and the
Guidelines' drug sentencing provisions in17particular. Readers desiring such
an introduction should consult Rebellion
A.

TE

RISE AND FALL OF~BDERAL DRUG SENTENCES

As Figure 1 and Table 1 below illustrate, the length of drug sentences
imposed by federal judges moved upwards markedly following the passage of
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which authorized the creation of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986
(ADAA),1 which imposed quantity-based minimum mandatory sentences for
drug crimes. Federal drug sentence length peaked in 1991-1992 at an
historically unprecedented level. However, the average length of federal
drug sentences has declined fairly steadily ever since.1
17. Bowman & Heise, supranote 1, at 1055-62.
18. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (as codified in 21 U.S.C. § 801).
19. Following the publication of Rebellion , the Justice Department's Bureau of'Justice Statistics issued a report that seemed to suggest drug sentences had moved steadily higher since
1984. See John Scalia, FederalDrug Offenders, 1999, with Trends 1984-99, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT, NCJ 187285 (August 2001). There was some discussion in the media about the apparent contradiction between our figures (or more properly the AO and USSC
figures we reported) and the results of the BJS report. SeeJerry Seper, Scholars DisputeJusticeReport on Drug Prison Terms, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2001, at A3, available at
http://vw.washtimes.com/national/20010820-72433714.htm (on file with the Iowa Law Review); Glenda Cooper, DrugCases, Sentences Up Sharply Since 1984,WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 2001, at
A2, availableat http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A33315-2001Aug19.html (on
file with the Iowa Law Review). However, there is no contradiction between our conclusions and
those of the August 2001 BJS report. The tension that drew media scrutiny arises from the fact
that the BJS reported only that 1999 sentences were higher than they were in 1986, without
mentioning the rise and fall in between.
Nonetheless, there is a more substantial conflict between AO and USSC figures and an
earlier BJS report. William J. Sabol & John McGready, Time Served in Prison by Federal Offenders,
1986-97, BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT, NCJ 171682 (June 1999). This study
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attempted to measure changes over time in the length of sentences actually served by convicted
offenders, as distinct from the sentences imposed byjudges. It found an increasein average real
sentences for drug offenders from 61 months in 1991 to 69.4 months in 1996, with a decrease
to 66.2 months in 1997. Id. at 5 tbl.2. We believe this result is erroneous. The BJS does not dispute that the average sentence imposed by judges on drug offenders fell between 1991 and
1996. See e-mails from John Scalia, Statistician, Bureau of Justice, to Frank Bowman, (Aug. 22
2001, 11:26AM EDT) (on file with authors). Thus, the Sabol and McGready report can only be
correct if there were some policy or practice of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) that required a
drug defendant sentenced in 1996 to serve a greater percentage of his judicially imposed sentence than a drug defendant sentenced in 1991. We are unaware of any such policy or practice,
and BJS has been unable to identify any such policy or practice in response to our inquiries on
the point.
The explanation for the erroneous conclusions of the Sabol and McGready report appears to lie in its method of computing what it calls "average time to be served by offenders entering Federal prison," a term the report defines as follows:
"Time to be served" is the amount of time that offenders who enter prison on a
U.S. district court commitment in a given year serve before their first release from
prison. Time to be served by offenders entering Federal prison is based on a combination of actual data on time servedfor offenders who were also released during the study periodand estimates of time to be servedfor those who had not been released.
Sabol & McGready, supra at 3 (emphasis added). In short, Sabol and McGready calculate the average "time to be served" in each past year by mixing two kinds of numbers: (1) BOP
statistics reporting exactly how long prisoners sentenced in the target year, but since released,
actually served, and (2) a set of predictionsabout how long those inmates sentenced in the target
year, but not yet released, will serve before release. The difficulty lies in the method of calculating the predictions. In essence, Sabol and McGready take the sentence imposed on the sentencing date and discount it by 13%, the maximum permissible reduction for good time under the
SRA. The trouble is that using the sentence imposed on the date of the original sentencing
does not account for later reductions in sentence arising from: (a) FED. R. GRIM. P. 35(b) substantial assistance motions post-sentencing; (b) FED. R CRIM. P. 35(a) reductions resulting from
resentencings on remand following appeal; or (c) BOP programs leading to early release, most
notably the one authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3621 (e) (2) (B) giving inmates with drug problems a
year off for completing a drug education program.
In consequence of these omissions, Sabol and McGready's estimate of the amount of
time yet to be served by inmates still inside at the time of measurement will always be longer
than that group of inmates will actually serve. Because the proportion of inmates with uncompleted sentences changes over time and grows larger as one approaches the year in which the
measurement is made, there is a built-in bias toward showing later years as having a longer "sentence to be served" than earlier years. This distorts efforts to measure the relative change in sentences from year to year. This hypothesis about the Sabol and McGready figures was recently
confirmed. Following the August 2001 newspaper coverage of the discrepancy between the figures in Rebellion land BJS numbers, the BJS requested that the Urban Institute recalculate timeto-be-served figures for 1986-1997 using the most current Bureau of Prisons statistics. The revised figures showed a decrease in "sentence to be served" in every year, with the amount of decrease growing progressively larger in later years. For example, while the original Sabol and
McGready study estimated average sentence to be served in 1991 as 61 months, in 1996 as 69.4
months, and in 1997 as 66.2 months, the revised figures report sentence to be served in 1991 as
60.2 months, in 1996 as 65.8 months, and in 1997 as 63.9 months. See e-mail from John Scalia,
Statistician, Bureau of Justice, to Frank Bowman, (Oct. 23, 2001, 1:47 PM EST) (on file with
authors). This result was entirely predictable because in each annual entering cohort the 2001
recalculation included more released defendants whose terms of imprisonment were actually
known, and fewer defendants still in prison whose "sentence to be served" is artificially inflated
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FIGURE 1: AVERAGE ANNUAL FEDERAL DRUG SENTENCE (MONTHS)"
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by Sabol and McGready's flawed method of predicting their final sentences.
We believe that more reliable figures for actual time served by federal drug offenders
can be found in PaulJ. Hofer & Courtney Semisch, ExaminingChanges in FederalSentencing Severity: 1980-1998, 12 FED. SENTENCING REP. 12, 15 (1999).
In any event, for our purposes it is not necessary to resolve the questions regarding
actual time served raised by Sabol and McGready's study and the Urban Institute/BJS recalibrations. There is no dispute that average sentences imposed by courts in drug cases have declined.
We are concerned both here and in Rebellion Iwith explaining that undeniable trend.
20. Data from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts for 1984-1999, and from the
U.S. Sentencing Commission for 1991-1998, reported in TRAC study, supranote 3. For average
drug sentence length as reported by the Sentencing Commission for 1999 and 2000, see 1999
SOURCEBOOK, supranote 5, at 32 fig.E and 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supranote 6, at 32 fig.E.
Figures collected independently by the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys of the U.S.
Department ofJustice also show a decline in overall average drug sentences from 86 months in
1992 to 67 months in 1998, a 22% percent decline. See Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), Syracuse University, New Findings: Overalk Federal Drug Sentences Substantially
Down, at http://trac.syr.edu/tracdea/findings/aboutDEA/neFindings.html (last visited Nov.
22, 2001) (on file with the Iowa Law Review). The average sentence in drug cases brought by the
DEA under Title 21 of the U.S. Code dropped from 94 months in 1992 to 75 months in 1998.
See Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), Syracuse University, NationalProfile
and Enforcement Trends Over Time, at http://trac.syr.edu/tracdea/findings/
national/xTIME9298.htmnl (lastvisited Nov. 22, 2001) (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
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TABLE 1: AVERAGE ANNUAL FEDERAL DRUG SENTENCE,

Year

1983-200021

Average Sentence

1983
1984
1985

AO
63.8
65.7
64.8

1986

70.0

1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996

73.0
78.0
73.8
79.3
95.7
87.8
83.2
84.3
88.7
82.5

85.6
88.2
86.5
87.6
86.6
84.3

1997

79.3

80.7

1998
1999

78.0
74.6

78.0
75.2

2000

[2002]

USSC

74.4

Two other trends should be noted. First, although the focus of this
Article is to explain trends in the average sentence length of drug
defendants sentenced to prison, it should not be forgotten that, since the
enactment of the ADAA and the Guidelines, the number of convicted drug
offenders who receive a nonincarcerative probationary sentence has
plummeted, from 22% in 1986,22 to 3.7% in 1999.23 Second, the number of
21. The sources for the statistics in Table 1 are AO and USSC data published in the TRAC
study, supra note 3, the 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, and the 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note
6.
22. Barbara Meierhoefer, The Severity of DrugSentences: A Result of Purpose or Chance?, 12
FED. SENTENCING REP. 34, 34 (1999) (citing data from Federal Bureau of Prisons website,
http://wv.bop.gov) (last visited Nov. 29, 2001).
23. 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 28 tbl.12. The Sentencing Commission reported
that, in 1999, 21,862 persons were sentenced for drug trafficking offenses, 395 were sentenced
for drug offenses involving a communication facility, and 671 were sentenced for simple possession. Of these groups, 475 drug trafficking defendants, twenty-three communication facility defendants, and 361 simple possession defendants received a straight nonincarcerative probationary sentence. Id The drop-off in straight probationary sentences was not limited to drug crimes.
In 1988, the fiscal year in which the Guidelines were implemented, the use of probation for all
types of crime was cut by over half. Hofer & Semisch, supra note 19, at 15. For white collar
crimes, between 1984 and 1991, straight probation declined from over 50% of all cases to
roughly 25%. Id. at 15 fig.4.
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convicted federal drug offenders more than doubled in the 1990s. In 1990,
11,124 drug offenders were sentenced in federal courts.24 By 2000, the
number was 23,424.25 The combination of historically high, even if now
gradually declining, average sentence lengths, the near-elimination of
probation in drug cases, and steadily rising numbers of federal drug
convictions had the predictable effect on the population of federal prisons.
The number of persons serving sentences in the Bureau of Prisons for drug
offenses has leapt higher since 1986, both in absolute numbers and as a
percentage of the federal prison population. In 1986, 12,119, or 38%, of the
total of 31,831 federal inmates were serving drug sentences.26 By May 1998,
the number of drug offenders in federal facilities had more than
quadrupled to 56,291, or 59% of the total of 95,522 federal inmates.
B.

THEEgFEcT OFNON-DISCRETIONARYFAcTORS ON FEDERAL DRUG SENTENCES

In Rebellion I, we considered the effect of seven non-discretionary factors
on average federal drug sentence length: (1) changes in federal sentencing
statutes; (2) changes in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines; (3) changes in
federal case law affecting drug sentences; (4) changes in proportion of drug
type prosecuted in federal courts (i.e., changes in the relative percentages of
marijuana, powder cocaine, crack cocaine, and heroin cases); (5) changes in
drug quantity per defendant; (6) changes in defendant role (i.e., whether
the government was prosecuting an increasing percentage of low-level
offenders); and (7) changes in the average criminal history category of
defendants (i.e., whether the government was prosecuting an increasing
percentage of first-time offenders) .28
1.

Statutory Changes

Since the effective date of the Guidelines in 1987, all but one of the
numerous changes in federal statutory law governing narcotics sentences
have either defined more conduct as criminal or lengthened prescribed terms
of imprisonment. 29 The lone exception is the so-called "safety valve."
24. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 55 tbl.K (1991).
25. 2000 SOURcEBOOK, supranote 6, at 81 fig.J, n.1.
26. Meierhoefer, supranote 22, at 34; see also Eric Simon, The Impact ofDrug-Law Sentencing
on the Federal Prison Population, 6 FED. SENTENCING REP. 29 (1993) (using Bureau of Prisons
computer model to show that drug sentencing accounted for the vast majority of the growth of
federal prison populations experienced by 1993).
27. Meierhoefer, supra note 22, at 34.
28. See Bowman & Heise, supra note 1, at 1068-74 (discussing effect of statutory changes);
id. at 1074-82 (discussing effect of Guidelines amendments); id. at 1082-87 (discussing effect of
case law); id. at 1087-90 (discussing effect of changes in proportion of drug type); id. at 1090-94
(discussing effect of changes in drug quantity per defendant); id. at 1094-100 (discussing effect
of changes in defendant role); and id. at 1100-01 (discussing effect of changes in defendants
criminal history).
29. Id. at 1069 n.96 (listing numerous changes in federal statutes increasing penalties for
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Effective September 23, 1994,30 Congress amended 18 U.S.C. § 3553 to
provide that a qualifying first-time nonviolent drug offender should be
sentenced under the applicable provision of the Guidelines, even if an
otherwise applicable minimum mandatory sentence would raise his sentence
above the bottom of the guideline range. 31 The statutory safety valve seems
to have had little, if any, immediate effect on average drug sentences. 32 In
drug offenses).
30. Section 80001 (c) of the Violent Crime and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994); provided that: "The amendment made by subsection (a) [enacting subsection (f) of this section] shall apply to all sentences imposed on or after the 10th day
beginning after the date of enactment of this Act [Sept. 13, 1994]."
The statutory safety valve is not retroactive. Delgado v. United States, 162 F.3d 981, 983
(8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Sanchez, 81 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez, 63 F.3d 892, 893 (9th Cir. 1995). But see United States v. Clark, 110 F.3d 15, 18 (6th
Cir. 1997) (holding that safety valve applies to cases that were pending on appeal on September
23, 1994).
31. The statutory safety valve provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (1994), permits imposition of
a sentence determined under the Sentencing Guidelines in lieu of a mandatory minimum sentence
if the court finds at sentencing, after the Government has been afforded
the opportunity to make a recommendation, that(1) the defendant does not have more than 1 criminal history point, as determined under the sentencing guidelines;
(2) the defendant did not use violence or credible threats of violence or
possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or induce another participant to do so) in connection with the offense;
(3) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury to any person;
(4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of
others in the offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines and
was not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in 21
U.S.C. 848; and
(5) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant has
truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence the
defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the
same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but the fact that
the defendant has no relevant or useful other information to provide or
that the Government is already aware of the information shall not preclude
a determination by the court that the defendant has complied with this requirement."
Id. The undoubted congressional purpose in enacting the safety valve amendment was to ameliorate the effects of quantity-based minimum mandatory sentences on first-time nonviolent
offenders. For a discussion of the history and functioning of the safety valve, see Virginia B.
Villa, Retooling MandatoryMinimum Sentencing Fixing the Federal "Statutory Safety Valve" to Act as an
Effective MechanisnforClemency in Appropriate Cases, 21 HAMLINE L. REv. 109; 110-24 (1997);Jane
L. Froyd, Comment, Safety Valve Failure:Low-Level Drug Offenders and the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 94 N.W. U. L. REV. 1471, 1484 (2000).
32. The timing of the adoption of the statutory safety valve allows an unusually accurate
estimate of its overall effect on average drug sentences in the following year. The statutory
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Fiscal Year (FY) 1995, the first year following its enactment, the statutory
safety valve was applied in 2610 out of 15,282 drug cases, or 17.07% of all
drug cases. 3 Nonetheless, sentencing figures from the Administrative Office
of the U.S. Courts show an increase in average drug sentence from 1994 to
1995 (from 84.3 to 88.7 months),34 and Sentencing Commission statistics
record a decrease from 1994 to 1995 of only one month (from 87.6 to 86.6
35
months).
The absence of any immediate observable impact of the statutory safety
valve is not terribly surprising.3 In those cases to which it applies, the statute
allows the Guidelines to operate as if there were no minimum mandatory
sentence. However, the drug provisions of the Guidelines were written to
conform to the structure of minimum mandatory sentences set out in the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 . Hence, the minimum mandatory sentence
for any given quantity of drugs is always very close to the range set by the
Guidelines for that quantity of drugs. For example, possession with intent to
distribute five kilograms of powder cocaine carries a statutory minimum
mandatory sentence of ten years (120 months) imprisonment, 8 while the
base offense level set by the Guidelines for the same quantity is 32, which
carries a sentencing range of 121-151 months. 39 Thus, in a case involving five
kilograms of cocaine in which the defendant went to trial, the safety valve
safety valve became effective on September 23, 1994, and applied to every drug case sentenced
on or after that date, regardless of when the conduct or conviction occurred. Moreover, the
effective date fell exactly one week before the commencement of Fiscal Year 1995 on October 1,
1994. Both the AO and the Commission prepare their statistical reports based on the fiscal year
calendar. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT xvi (1996) [hereinafter 1995
ANNUAL REPORT] ("This annual report covers fiscal year 1995 (October 1, 1994, through September 30, 1995)."); LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS: 1999 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 14 (2000), availableat http://www.uscourts.
gov/judbusl999/contents.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2001) (noting that data in the Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts is collected by fiscal year) (on file with the Iowa Law Review). Consequently, only one week's worth of cases reported in the 1994 figures by either agency would have been sentenced under the statutory
safety valve, whereas all of the 1995 cases were subject to it.
33. Telephone Conference with Lou Reedt, U.S. Sentencing Commission (July 2000)
(data derived from U.S. Sentencing Commission datafile MONFY 1995).
34. TRAC study, supranote 3.
35. Id.
36. For a discussion of whether the safety valve exerted a differential racial impact on defendants sentenced for crack and powder cocaine offenses, see Celesta A. Albonetti, The Effects
of the "Safety Valve" Amendment on Length of Imprisonmentfor Cocaine Trafficking/ManufacturingOf
fenders: Mitigating the Effects of Mandatory Minimum Penalties and Offenders Ethnicity, 87 IOWA L.
REV. 401 (2002).
37. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
38. 21 U.S.C.§841(b)(1)(A)(ii)(1994).
39.

See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES MANUAL (U.S.S.G.)

§§

2D1.1 (c) (4) & 5A (2001). A sentencing range of 121-151 months assumes a Criminal History
Category of I.
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would have no impact at all because the guideline sentence would be higher
than the minimum mandatory sentence.
Even a defendant who pleads guilty and receives a two- or three-level
decrease for acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1 .140 will probably
receive no direct benefit from the statutory safety valve unless the drug
amount in his case happens to fall exactly at, or just above, the trigger point
for a mandatory minimum sentence. By way of illustration, if a defendant
eligible for the statutory safety valve possessed with intent to distribute
exactly five kilograms of powder cocaine (thus triggering the ten-year
minimum mandatory sentence) and received a two-level acceptance of
responsibility reduction, his guideline sentencing range would be 30, or 97121 months. The safety valve would waive the 120-month mandatory
minimum, so the judge could sentence the defendant to 97 months rather
than 120 months, a definite benefit to the defendant. However, if the same
defendant possessed fifteen or more kilograms of cocaine, his base offense
level would be at least 34. Thus, his guideline range, even with the two-level
acceptance reduction, would be at least 32, or 121-151 months. Hence,
41
waiver of the 120-month mandatory minimum would be of no service at all.
This same phenomenon occurs with all drug types-unless the drug
quantity attributed to the defendant is at or just above a mandatory
minimum trigger point, the statutory safety valve provides little direct relief.
The real boon that the statutory safety valve grants to defendants is indirect.
That is, by eliminating the minimum mandatory floor on the legally
permissible sentence, the statutory safety valve permits the operation of
other wholly or partly discretionary mitigating guideline provisions, such as
non-substantial assistance departures 42 and reductions for mitigating role in
the offense. 3 These and other provisions will be discussed in detail below.
For the moment, the key point is this: we list the statutory safety valve as a
"non-discretionary factor" because it is a congressional enactment; however,
its true significance is that for eligible first-time offenders it opens the door
to an array of discretionary choices previously foreclosed to lawyers and
40. U.S.S.G. § 3EL.1 (2001). Section 3El.l(a) provides for a tvo-offense-level decrease
where a defendant "clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense." Section
3E1.l(b) provides an additional one-level reduction for defendants who demonstrate acceptance of responsibility and also timely notify authorities of their intention to plead guilty and
provide "complete information to the government concerning [their] own involvement in the
offense."
41. In addition, even a defendant whose drug quantity is near the mandatory minimum
trigger point and who receives an acceptance of responsibility reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1
(2000), may garner no benefit from the statutory safety valve if he is subject to guideline enhancements or adjustments such as those for abuse of trust or special skill, U.S.S.G. § 3BI.3
(2000), or using a minor to commit a crime, U.S.S.G. § 3B1.4 (2000). (All figures in the example set out in the text assume a Criminal History Category of I.)
42. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (2001).

43.

Id§ 3B1.2.
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judges by operation of the mandatory minimum sentence statutes. 44 There is
little evidence that the statutory safety valve itself directly caused drug
sentences to decline, and its passage certainly did not compel front line
sentencing actors to exercise the discretion granted them by other elements
of the guideline system to reduce drug sentences. Nonetheless, we view the
1994 passage of the statutory safety valve as an important precondition for
45
some of the discretionary drug sentence reduction that followed.
In sum, excepting the safety valve, all the numerous changes in federal
drug sentencing statutes between 1989 and 1999 would tend to increase the
average length of drug sentences. The significance of the statutory safety
valve is that it clears the way for increased exercises of sentencing discretion
in those cases to which it applies.
2.

Guidelines Changes

Between 1991 and 1999, the Sentencing Commission adopted a
number of amendments to the drug guidelines, some of which increased
and some of which decreased drug sentences. In Rebellion I, we considered
the possible effect on average drug sentence length of the most significant
of these amendments: the 1995 adoption of a Guidelines safety valve; 46 the
1992 amendment of the acceptance of responsibility guideline to offer an
additional one-level reduction to those who plead guilty promptly and reveal
the extent of their own misconduct to the prosecution; 47 the 1994
elimination of the top two levels of the drug quantity table;48 the change in
weight equivalency for marijuana plants;49 changes to the application notes
defining "mixture or substance"; 50 the amendment to the scope of
44. Moreover, the applicability of the safety valve is itself a mixed question of fact and law
subject to a degree of discretionary choice by both prosecutors and judges. Bowman & Heise,
supranote 1, at 1072-73.
45. Important though the statutory safety valve doubtless is, it is possible to overemphasize
its impact. After all, by 2000, only 26.1% of all drug cases were subject to either the statutory
safety valve or the guideline safety valve, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 (b) (6) (2000), enacted in 1995. 2000
SOURcEBOOK, supranote 6, at 79 tbl.44.
46. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(4) (1995). The section has subsequently been rearranged so that
subsection (b)(4) is now subsection (b) (6). U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b) (6) (2000).
47. U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 459 (Nov. 1, 1992).
48. Id. amend. 505 (Nov. 1, 1994).
49. Id. amend. 516 (Nov. 1, 1994) (adding Paragraph 4 of the "Background" to U.S.S.G. §
2D1.1).
50. Id. amend. 484 (Nov. 1, 1993) (amending U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, application note I to state,
inter alia, "[m]ixture or substance does not include materials that must be separated from the
controlled substance before the controlled substance can be used").
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5
conspiratorial liability under the relevant
.... conduct guideline, § 1B1.3; 52 and
five different amendments increasing penalties for methamphetamine.
We have been unable to quantify the net effect of these amendments on
average drug sentence length. However, we think it fair to conclude that,
with the possible exceptions of the guideline safety valve and the acceptance
of responsibility amendment, as a group these Guidelines changes have only
a weak explanatory connection to the continuing decline in drug sentences.
Excepting the safety valve and acceptance provisions, the amendments
lowering sentences would have affected only a small number of cases. Each
amendment would have had its greatest effect on the overall average drug
sentence in the year following its adoption, with little measurable impact on
the change in overall average in ensuing years. Yet all the amendments we
have identified with a potential to push average sentences down were
53
enacted from 1992-1995, and would have taken effect no later than 1996.
Thus, these amendments cannot help explain the continuing decline in
average sentences in 1997-2000. Furthermore, the downward pressure
exerted by some Guidelines amendments would have been counteracted by
other amendments (particularly those involving methamphetamine enacted
between 1995 and 199754) that increased drug sentences. This having been
said, a few additional comments about the guideline safety valve and the
amendment to the acceptance of responsibility guideline are in order.

a.

The GuidelineSafety Valve

In 1995, the Sentencing Commission followed Congress's lead and
enacted a "safety valve" of its own. The Commission amended the drug
guideline to provide that a defendant who has an offense level of 26 or
greater, and otherwise meets the requirements of the statutory safety valve,
will receive a two-level decrease in offense level.55 The new guideline safety
valve became effective for cases sentenced on or after November 1, 1995. It
applies to all drug offenses, not merely those listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(0
which carry minimum mandatory sentences.*r In Rebellion I, we noted that
51. Id. amend. 503 (Nov. 1, 1994) (amending U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 to state that a "defendant's
relevant conduct does not include the conduct of members of a conspiracy prior to the defendant'sjoining the conspiracy, even if the defendant knows of the conduct").
52. Bowman & Heise, supranote 1, at 1080-82.
53. Id. at 1074-82.
54. Id. at 1080-82.
55. U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.1 (b) (4) (1995). The section has subsequently been rearranged so that
subsection (b) (4) is now subsection (b) (6). U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 (b) (6) (2000). Effective November
1, 2001, the Sentencing Commission eliminated the requirement of a minimum base offense
level of twenty-six as a prerequisite for safety valve eligibility. U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 624 (Nov.
1, 2001). By expanding safety valve eligibility, this amendment may produce even lower average
drug sentences in FYt 2001.
56. United States v. Osei, 107 F.3d 101, 104 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Mertilus, 111
F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 1997).
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the advent of the guideline safety valve doubtless had some immediate
impact on average drug sentences. 7 In 1996, the first year in which the
guideline safety valve was in effect, 19.2% of all drug defendants received a
guideline safety valve reduction. 5s Unsurprisingly, the award of a new twooffense-level credit to nearly one in five drug defendants seems to have had
an impact on average sentence length. In 1996, AO sentencing figures
showed a dramatic drop in average drug sentence (from 88.7 months in
1995, to 82.5 months in 1996) ,59 and the Commission reported a two-month
decrease from the preceding year (from 86.6 months in 1995, to 84.3
months in 1996).60
As we also noted in Rebellion I, however, the percentage of cases in
which the guideline safety valve applied increased only modestly from 1996
to 1997 (from 19.2% in 1996,61 to 23.7% in 199762), and hardly at all from
1997 to 1999 (from 23.7% in 1997,6 to 24.7% in 1998,6 and 24.9% in
19990). Thus, the guideline safety valve likely had only a slight direct effect
on the continued decline in average sentence length in 1997-1999. In 2000,
the guideline safety valve rate accelerated slightly more markedly (from
24.9% in 19996 to 26.1% in 200067).
Moreover, there is another interesting correlation that we did not
highlight in Rebellion . Recall that both the statutory and guideline safety
valves are available only to first-time offenders. Nonetheless, while the
percentage of defendants to whom one or the other safety valve was awarded
increased from 1995 to 1999 (from 17.07% in 1995r8 to 26.1% in 200069),
during the same period the percentage of defendants who were first-time
offenders eligible for the safety valve decreased (from 57.8% in 1995,70 to
56.0% in 200071). The fact that the courts awarded an increasing percentage
57.

Bowman & Heise, supranote 1, at 1071-72.

58.

UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1996 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING

STATISTICS 54 tbl.39 (1997) [hereinafter 1996 SOURCEBOOK].
59. TRAC study, supranote 3.
60. Id
61. 1996 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 58, at 54 tbl.39.
62. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1997 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS 79 tbl.44 (1998) [hereinafter 1997 SOURCEBOOK].
63.
Ld.
64. UNrrED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1998 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS 79 tbl.44 (1999) [hereinafter 1998 SOURCEBOOK].
65. 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supranote 5, at 79 tbl.44.
66. Id.
67. 2000 SOuRCEBOOK, supranote 6, at 79 tbl.44.
68. Telephone Conversation with Lou Reedt, Acting Director of Policy Analysis, U.S. Sentencing Commission (July 2000) (data derived from U.S. Sentencing Commission datafile
MONFY 1995).
69. 2000 SOIJRCEBOOK, supranote 6, at 79 tbl.44.
70. 1995 ANNUAL REPoRT, supranote 32, at 106 tbl.41.
71. 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 72 tbl.37. The quoted percentages are drug defen-
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of mitigating safety valve adjustments to a declining percentage of eligible
defendants is at least suggestive of an increasing tendency to exercise
discretion in the direction of leniency.
b. "SuperAcceptance of Responsibility"
In 1992, the Sentencing Commission amended § 3El.1 to authorize an
additional one-level reduction over and above the already existing two-level
acceptance of responsibility reduction for those who plead guilty promptly,
reveal the extent of their own misconduct to the prosecution, and have a
72
guideline range of 16 or greater. This additional reduction is referred to
colloquially as "super acceptance of responsibility." One point about the
incidence of "super acceptance" adjustments noted in -Rebellion I is worth
reemphasizing here. From 1993, the first year in which "super acceptance"
adjustments were available, through 2000, the percentage of drug cases in
which at least the original two-level acceptance reduction was awarded grew
from 80.4% 73 to 90.1%.74 By contrast, in the same period, the percentage of
cases in which "super acceptance" was awarded increased from 50.8% of all
75
drug trafficking offenders in 1993, to 82.1% of all drug offenders in 2000.76
While the two-level acceptance adjustment has always been a nearly
automatic benefit of a guilty plea, the award of the third "super acceptance"
level is contingent on satisfaction of additional criteria. The required
determinations of whether the notification of intention to plead guilty was
sufficiently prompt 77 and whether the disclosure to the government was
"complete"7 8 are both highly subjective, and thus partly discretionary,
dants in Criminal History Category I, meaning that they have zero or one criminal history point,
and thus qualify for safety valve treatment pursuant to both 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (1) (2001) and
U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 (2000).
72. U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 459 (Nov. 1, 1992).
73. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1993 ANNUAL REPORT 90 tbl.29 (1994) [hereinafter
1993 ANNUAL REPORT].
74. 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 76 tbl.41. The increase in percentage of at least
two-level acceptance adjustments among drug defendants continued in 2000. The percentage
rose from 89.7% in 1999, to 90.1% in 2000. Compare 1999 SOURGEBOOK, supra note 5, at 769
tbl.41, with 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supranote 6, at 79 tbl.41.
75. 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 73, at 90 tbl.29.
76. 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supranote 6, at 76 tbl.41. The increase in percentage of three-level
.super acceptance" adjustments among drug defendants also continued in 2000. The percentage rose from 80.2% in 1999 to 82.1% in 2000. Compare 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supranote 5, at 76
tbl.41, with 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supranote 6 at 79 tbl.41.
77. The first prerequisite to receiving the extra level is an early decision to plead guilty,
one made, as the Guidelines say, sufficiently soon to permit "the government to avoid preparing
for trial" and "the court to allocate its resources efficiently." U.S.S.G. § 3El.1 (b) (2) (2000).
78. The second prerequisite for "super acceptance" is that the defendant "timely" provide
.complete information to the government concerning his own involvement in the offense." Id.
§ 3El.1 (b) (1). In determining whether this condition has been met, the sentencing judge necessarily relies heavily on the assessment of government counsel. That assessment has a significant discretionary element.
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judgments. Thus, although the award of the third level is mandatory once the
judge has found that the defendant has met its factual prerequisites,79 a judge has
tremendous de facto discretion to award or withhold the adjustment.
Assigning a reason for the increased incidence of "super acceptance"
adjustments in drug cases is a more daunting challenge. It might be that
system actors have been consciously seeking to reduce drug sentences.
Alternatively, all or at least a significant part of the seven-year 31% rise in
"super acceptance" reductions might be attributable to a sort of "learning
curve," during which all the actors in the system, most notably defendants
and their lawyers, became habituated to the additional benefit the "super
acceptance" provision confers on early pleas and changed the timing of
their decision-making accordingly. Closer examination of acceptance of
responsibility statistics sheds some interesting light on these competing
hypotheses.
TABLE 2: ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSBILIT10 °
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

3-level
Drug Cases

3-level
Non-Drug Cases

Guilty Plea Rate,
Drug Cases'

Guilty Plea Rate,
All Casesf

50.8%
65.9%
70.6%
74.7%
76.1%
78.8%
80.2%
82.1%

20.7%
30.2%
31.4%
32.9%
35.3%
39.3%
43.3%
45.3%

85.3%
87.8%
89.8%
90.2%
91.9%
92.5%
94.2%
95.3%

88.5%
90.5%
91.9%
91.4%
93.2%
93.6%
94.6%
95.5%

79. See ROGER W. HAINES, JR, FRANK 0. BowMiAN, III & JENNIFER C. WOLL, FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES HANDBOOK 1008 (West Group 2001) (stating that "[tlhe extra onelevel reduction ... is not discretionary if the required showing is made" and collecting cases in
support of that proposition).
80. The data underlying the figures in the first two columns of Table 2--"3-level Drug
Cases" and "3-level Non-Drug Cases"-are drawn from the following sources: 1993 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 73, at 90 tbl.29; U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT 70
tbl.26 (1995) [hereinafter 1994 ANNUAL REPORT]; 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 76
tbl.24; 1996 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 58, at 33 tbl.19 and 51 tbl.36; 1997 SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 62, at 43 tbl.19; 1998 SOURcEBOOK, supranote 64, at 43 tbl.19; 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 5, at 43 tbl.19; 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supranote 6, at 43 tbl.19.
81. The data underlying the "Guilty Plea Rate, Drug Cases" column of Table 2 for the period 1993-1999 are drawn from the following sources: 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 73, at
140 tbl.55; 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 80, at 111 tbl.50; 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote
32, at 113; 1996 SOURcEBOOK, supra note 58, at 50 tbl.33; 1997 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 62, at
43 tbl.19 and 73 tbl.40; 1998 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 64, at 43 tbl.19 and 73 tbl.38; 1999
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 43 tbl.19 and 73 tbl.38; 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 43
tbl.19 and 73 thl.38.
82. The data underlying the "Guilty Plea Rate, All Cases" column of Table 2 are drawn
from the following sources: 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 69 tbl.21; 1994 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 80, at 51 tbl.19; 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 53 tbl.16; 1996
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 58, at 16 tbl.10; 1997 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 62, at 21 tbl.10; 1998
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 64, at 21 tbl.10; 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 21 tbl.10; 2000
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 21 tbl.10.
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As illustrated in Table 2, the percentage of drug cases in which the
acceptance" provision confers on early pleas and changed the timing of
their decision-making accordingly. Closer examination of acceptance of
responsibility statistics sheds some interesting light on these competing
hypotheses.three-level "super acceptance of responsibility" adjustment was
awarded jumped from 50.8% in 1993, its first year of operation, to 65.9% in
its second year, 1994. It is not unreasonable to attribute this dramatic initial
rise to a period of adjustment of plea bargaining patterns and timing. For
our purposes, the more revealing period is 1995-2000. The percentage of
drug defendants to whom the "super-acceptance" adjustment was awarded
continued rising significantly even in the third and fourth years of its
operation, increasing from 65.9% in 1994, to 70.6% in 1995, and again to
74.7% in 1996. Thereafter, in 1997-2000, the rate of "super acceptance"
adjustments in drug cases continued to increase, albeit by a much lower
percentage. Even in this period, however, the increase in percentage of
"super acceptance" adjustments in drug cases (which rose by 7.4% from the
end of 1996 through 2000) exceeded the increase in percentage of guilty
pleas in such cases (which rose by only 4.9% in the same interval). This
latter observation is at least suggestive because an award of the "super
acceptance" reduction is conditioned on a guilty plea; hence, from the end
of 1996 through 2000 the proportion of drug defendants who received
"super acceptance" adjustments increased at a faster rate than the pool of
defendants eligible for such reductions.
The significant increases in drug case "super acceptance" adjustments
in 1995 and 1996 are particularly intriguing. It seems improbable that in
1995-1996, three to four years after the enactment of the "super acceptance"
adjustment in 1992, significant numbers of lawyers were just discovering the
fact that the "super acceptance" provision made early pleas advantageous. By
comparison, in non-drug cases, the rate of "super acceptance" adjustments
jumped by nearly 10% from 1993 to 1994, but increased by only about 5%
over the next three years. 83 For some reason peculiar to drug cases, the
proportion of drug defendants to whom the system was prepared to award
'super acceptance" adjustments did not plateau after only two years, but
continued to increase substantially for two additional years. Moreover, even
in 1997-2000, the rate of "super acceptance" adjustments in drug cases
increased faster than the rate of guilty pleas. We have no definitive
83. As reflected in Table 2 above, the rate of super acceptance adjustments in non-drug
cases rose substantially from 1997-2000. This increase appears largely attributable to changes in
immigration offenses. Between 1997 and 2000, the number of immigration cases sentenced increased from 4965 (13.7% of all federal cases) to 8919 (19.9% of all federal cases). Compare
1997 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 62, at 11 fig. A and 43 tbl.19, with 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supranote
6, at 11 fig. A and 43 tbl.19. In the same period, the percentage of immigration defendants receiving three-level acceptance adjustments rose from 37.5% to 58.7%. Compare 1997
SOURCEBOOK, supranote 62, at 43 tbl.19, with 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supranote 6, at 43 tbl.19.
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explanation for these facts; however, they are consistent with the hypothesis
that for nearly a decade lawyers and judges have tended-to an ever
increasing degree-to exercise discretion in drug cases in the direction of
leniency.
c.

Summary of Guidelines Changes

In sum, during 1992-2000, some changes to the Guidelines would have
tended to push sentences higher. Others would have tended to push them
lower. Neither individually nor in the aggregate do any of the guideline
changes appear sufficient to account for the seven-year downward trend.
It is also critical to emphasize here a point we may have stressed
inadequately in Rebellion . For purposes of analysis, we categorized potential
causes of declining drug sentences as either discretionary or nondiscretionary. We placed statutory and guideline amendments in the nondiscretionary category because they were the acts of national lawmaking
bodies, not of individual sentencing actors, and they applied to whole
subclasses of drug defendants. We think our taxonomy makes sense as a first
cut, but one must constantly be alert to the distinction between the
immediate effects of enactment of a new statute or guideline, on the one
hand, and subsequent changes in the frequency of its application, on the
other. The Guidelines safety valve and the "super acceptance of
responsibility" provision both illustrate this distinction. In both cases, the
decision of the Sentencing Commission to enact these amendments had the
immediate effect of reducing the sentences of a core percentage of drug
defendants. This immediate effect is properly thought of as the result of a
non-discretionary factor. However, if the judges and lawyers administering
the Guidelines steadily expand the application of a mitigating guideline
amendment to a proportion of drug defendants substantially larger than the
original core group, the expansion ought to be examined as a source of
discretionary change (at least in the absence of evidence that the population
of defendants is changing in a way that would itself cause increased
application of the new guideline). In the cases of the Guidelines safety valve
and the "super acceptance" amendment, the immediate non-discretionary
impacts on a significant percentage of drug defendants were followed by
steady yearly increases in application of the new provisions, increases that
appear to stem at least in some part from discretionary choice.
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Changes in Case Law

In Rebellion I, we examined the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court to
identify changes in case law between 1992 and 1999 that might have affected
the average length of drug sentences. 84 Four cases or groups of cases stood
out. First, we noted the group of decisions in which the Court upheld
important features of federal drug sentencing law that tend to keep drug
sentences high. 5
Second, in addition to cases directly concerning the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, the Court handed down decisions in cases originating in state
courts that have had the effect of foreclosing challenges to stiff federal drug
sentences.8 6
Third, we discussed the 1996 Supreme Court decision in Koon v. United
States,87 an opinion universally interpreted as conferring greater discretion
on district court judges to depart from the otherwise applicable guideline
range. The effect of Koon will be revisited below.88
Fourth, Rebellion I discussed the December 1995 Supreme Court
decision in Bailey v. United States.89 Bailey construed the language of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c), which imposed a five-year or greater mandatory minimum prison
84. We are aware of no decision handed down since the manuscript of Rebellion Iwas finalized that would have materially affected average drug sentences in 2000.
85. These included Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding the constitutionality of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984); Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511
(1998) (relying on the relevant conduct section, § 1B1.3, in upholding a sentence based on the
offense level for crack, even though the jury found conspiracy to sell powder cocaine or-crack);
United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997), (upholding controversial guidelines rule that conduct underlying charges of which a defendant has been acquitted may be relied upon in sentencing); Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120 (1996) (holding that a government motion
under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 is not sufficient to make a defendant eligible for a departure below a
statutory minimum mandatory sentence absent a separate government motion under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(e)); Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993) (holding the Guidelines Manual's
commentary is authoritative and binding on federal courts); Wade v. United States, 504 U.S.
181 (1992) (holding that both 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 give "the Government
a power, not a duty, to file a motion when a defendant has substantially assisted"). The Supreme
Court has also ruled on particular drug-related Guidelines provisions. See Chapman v. United
States, 500 U.S. 453, 461-62 (1991) (holding that 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b) (1) requires that the "carrier medium" for drugs such as LSD (typically blotter paper or sugar cubes) must be included
when determining the weight of the drug for purposes of determining a mandatory minimum
sentence).
86. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (holding that a state sentence of life
imprisonment without parole for a first-time offender who possessed one-and-one-half pounds
of cocaine was not cruel and unusual punishment). Relying on Hannelin, the circuit courts have
uniformly rejected Eighth Amendment challenges to long federal drug sentences. See HAINES,
BOWMAN & WOLL, supra note 79, at 24 n.57 (listing numerous cases rejecting Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment challenges to federal drug sentences).
87. 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
88. See infra notes 188, 218, and accompanying text.
89. 516 U.S. 137 (1995). Baileywas decided on December 6, 1995.
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term, consecutive to any other sentence, 90 on any person who "during and in
relation to any... drug trafficking crime ... uses or carries a firearm." 91 The
Supreme Court held that a § 924(c) conviction for "use" of a firearm during
and in relation to a drug crime could not be sustained unless the defendant
"actively employed" the weapon in relation to the predicate offense.92 The
decision produced a wave of litigation from prisoners convicted of § 924(c)
counts and a substantial number of reversals of those counts.93 Effective
November 13, 1998, Congress enacted a "Bailey-fix" that broadened the
language of § 924(c) to cover anyone who "in furtherance of any [drug
trafficking] crime, possesses a firearm." 94 In effect, the new legislation
brought most of the cases excluded from § 924(c) by Bailey back into the
ambit of the statute.
We concluded that the Bailey decision might have had a modest
lowering effect on average drug sentences imposed between December 1995
and November 19 98 .95 Sentencing Commission drug sentence figures
include sentence enhancements imposed for § 924(c) convictions if the
defendant was also convicted of a drug offense.96 For example, a defendant
sentenced to five years under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) for selling cocaine, and an
additional five years for violating § 924(c) by displaying a pistol during the
sale, is counted by the Sentencing Commission as receiving a ten-year
sentence for drug trafficking. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that a
decline in the percentage of drug defendants with § 924(c) convictions
would, all else being equal, cause some decline in the national average
sentence length. However, we were unable to prove the existence of a "Bailey
effect," or to measure its magnitude.
Our appreciation of the complications of the drug-firearms nexus has
been enhanced since Rebellion Iby a recent study from the Bureau ofJustice
Statistics (BJS) on the prosecution and sentencing of federal firearm
offenders. The BJS study found an immediate precipitous decline in
federal firearms prosecutions in January 1996, the month following the
90. A defendant must be sentenced to five years, to be served consecutively to any other
sentence, for his first conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and to twenty years consecutive "in
the case of his second or subsequent" conviction. Moreover, the twenty-year penalty applies
even if the defendant suffers his second or subsequent § 924(c) conviction in the same trial as
his first. Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993).
91. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1995) (emphasis added).
92. Bailey, 516 U.S. at 144.
93. For a discussion of a representative sample of such cases, see HAINES, BOWMAN &
WOLL, supranote 79, at 415 nn.630-33.
94. Pub. L. No. 105-386, § 1(a)(1), 112 Stat. 3469 (1998).
95. Bowman & Heise, supranote 1, at 1085-86.
96. Telephone Interview with Louis W. Reedt, Acting Director of Policy Analysis, U.S. Sentencing Commission (June 2000).
97. JOHN SCAUA, BUREAu OF JusTicE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: FEDERAL FIREARM
OFFENDERS, 1992-98, at 9 tbl.8 (2000) [hereinafter BJS FIREARMs REPORT].
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Bailey decision. 98 The study also suggested that federal prosecutors engage in
a high rate of charge bargaining in cases with § 924(c) counts. 99 However,
the effect of these observations on the downward trend in average drug
sentences remains unclear. First, we have been unable to find statistics
showing the annual figures for only those § 924(c) convictions in which the
predicate offense is a drug infraction. The BJS report does not distinguish §
924(c) drug cases from other § 924(c) convictions. Similarly, Sentencing
Commission statistics do not distinguish between drug cases with § 924(c)
convictions and drug cases with other types of firearm enhancements.'
Therefore, we can only draw rough inferences from the available mixed
data.
Second, although the number of § 924(c) convictions declined
following Bailey, we are not sure how many fewer § 924(c) cases involving
drugs were filed in 1996-1997 than had previously been the case. The 2000
BJS report on federal firearm offenses states that the number of § 924(c)
cases declined from 1685 in 1995, to 1392 in 1996, and 1231 in 1997, before
rising to 1337 in 1998.101 However, because BJS does not separate out those
cases in which the underlying offense is a drug violation, we cannot know
what impact these declines would have made on drug sentencing statistics.
Third, even if we knew how many fewer drug cases involving § 924(c)
convictions occurred immediately following Bailey, the causal relationship
between Bailey and the decline would remain in doubt. The number of §
924(c) convictions had been declining precipitously in the two years before
Bailey was decided, falling from a high of 2350 in 1993, to 1985 in 1994, and
1685 in 1995. l °0 Whether Bailey caused further decline after 1995, or
whether those declines would have occurred anyway in response to preexisting trends, is unknowable.
Finally, determining the magnitude of the sentence decrease in any
case where a § 924(c) count was not filed due to Bailey is rendered more
difficult because the Sentencing Guidelines provide for a two-offense-level
enhancement "if a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed"
in connection with a narcotics offense. 10 3 This enhancement does not apply
if the defendant has been convicted of a § 924(c) count for the same
98. Id. at 3, 9 tbl.8.
99. Id. at 6-7.
100. See 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 74 tbl.39 n.2 (describing contents of table
measuring weapon involvement in drug cases and noting that the table combines Guidelines
adjustments for weapons possession under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 (b) (1) and convictions under 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)).
101. BJS FREARMs REPORT, supranote 95, at 9 tbl.8.
102. Id.
103. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) (1998). Application Note 3 to § 2D1.1 states that, "The adjustment should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the
weapon was connected with the offense." Id.
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weapon in the same case.10 Thus, a defendant who escaped a § 924(c) count
might nonetheless receive a guideline weapon enhancement of roughly
25%. In the end, all we can say is that a drop in the percentage of drug
convictions accompanied by a § 924(c) count would depress average drug
sentence length. But whether such a drop occurred, what its magnitude
might have been, and whether Bailey caused it or whether it resulted wholly
or in part from other causes altogether, is unclear. 1°5
In sum, with the exception of a possible transitory effect of Bailey on
cases involving firearms, Supreme Court case law between 1992 and 1999
seems to have had no direct downward impact on drug sentences. For our
purposes, the more important development in Supreme Court
jurisprudence was the 1996 Koon decision insofar as it created a more
hospitable climate for the exercise of discretionary choice by sentencing
judges, a point to which we will return presently.
4.

Changes in Type of Case or Type of Defendant

In Rebellion I, we considered the possible effect on average drug
sentences of four variables related to changes in the type of cases or
defendants prosecuted for drug crimes in federal court from 1992-1999: (1)
changes in drug type; (2) changes in drug amount; (3) changes in
defendants' role in the offense; and (4) changes in average criminal history
category of the defendant.
a. Changes in Drug Type
Federal drug prosecutions involve five major drug types: powder
cocaine, crack cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana.
Although federal law criminalizes possession or trafficking in many other
drugs (e.g., LSD, PCP, steroids, etc.1°6), these five types account for almost
98% of all federal narcotics cases.10 7 The average sentence imposed for each
of the five primary drug types differs significantly. For example, in 2000, the
mean sentences for marijuana, heroin, powder cocaine, methamphetamine,
104. U.S.S.G. § 2K2A, application note 2 (1998). See HAINES, BowMAN & WOLL, supra note
79, at 696-97 (discussing bar on increasing guideline offense level for firearm possession in case
where defendant is convicted of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) violation).
105. One alternative theory is that the decline in § 924(c) convictions for both drug and
non-drug cases between 1992 and 1997 may have resulted from an increased disposition by
prosecutors to dismiss or not charge such counts as part of a plea bargain. This possibility is discussed below, infra notes 200-04 and accompanying text.
106. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (A) (iv) (1994) (prescribing mandatory minimum penalty for
offenses involving 100 grams or more of phencyclidine (POP); id § 841(b) (1)(A)(v) (prescribing mandatory minimum penalty for offenses involving ten grams or more of LSD).
107. 2000 SouRcEBooK, supranote 6, at 69 tbl.34 (showing that of 23,366 defendants sentenced to prison for drug offenses in 1999, only 557, or 2.7%, were sentenced for drugs other
than cocaine (powder or crack), heroin, marijuana, or methamphetamine). The percentages in
1999 were virtually identical. 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supranote 5, at 69 tbl.34.
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and crack cocaine were, respectively, 36.4 months, 63.2 months, 77.0
months, 87.8 months, and 119.5 months.10 Therefore, significant variations
in the proportions of drug types for which offenders are prosecuted might
affect the national average drug sentence. For example, if during the study
period the number of crack offenders (2000 average sentence 119.5
months) had dramatically decreased, while the number of marijuana
offenders (2000 average sentence 36.4 months) dramatically increased, and
the number of cases involving the other three drugs remained constant, the
effect would be to push the overall average sentence down.
As illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 below, from 1992-2000, both the
absolute number of cases of each major drug type and the proportion of
each drug type to the whole population of sentenced drug defendants varied
considerably.
FIGURE 2: NUMBER OF DRUG OFFENDERS, BY DRUGTYPE' ° 9
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SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 81 fig.J.
The data underlying Figure 2 are drawn from the following sources: 1992 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 5, at 89 tbl.32; 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 144 fig.G; 1994
ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 80, at 115 fig.K; 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 32, at 110 fig.K;
1996 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 58, at 56 fig.I; 1997 SOURCEBOOK, supranote 62, at 81 fig.J; 1998
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 64, at 84 figJ; 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 81 figJ; and 2000
SOURCEBOOK, supranote 6, at 81 figJ.
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FIGURE 3: RELATIVE SHARE
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Despite these variations, in Rebellion Iwe concluded that changes in the
proportions of drug types prosecuted in federal courts between 1992 and
1999 did not cause the decline in average drug sentence length in that
period.1 The most important evidence supporting this conclusion is the
fact that between 1992 and 1999 the average sentence imposed within all
five major drug types declined.1 1 2 Beginning in 1994, this decline was nearly
uninterrupted in every major drug type.1 With the exception of
methamphetamine sentences (which fluctuated throughout the period,
presumably in response to statutory canges 14) and a single uptick in heroin
sentences from 1998 to 1999, the average sentence for all major drug types
declined every year between 1994 and 1999.

110. The data underlying Figure 3 are drawn from the following sources: 1992 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 5, at 89 tbl.32; 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 144 fig.G; 1994
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 80, at 115 fig.K 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 32, at 110 fig.K;
1996 SOURcEBOOK, supra note 58, at 56 fig.I; 1997 SOURCEBOOK, supranote 62, at 81 fig.J; 1998
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 64, at 84 fig.J; 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 81 fig.J; and 2000
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 81 figJ.
111. Bowman & Heise, supranote 1, at 1087-90, 1103.
112. Infranotes 115-16 and accompanying figure and table.
113. Id.
114. See Bowman & Heise, supra note 1, at 1080-82 (describing some of the Guidelines
amendments affecting sentence length for methamphetamine defendants).
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In 2000, the sentence decline within drug type continued for the drugs
with the highest average sentences-powder cocaine, crack cocaine, and
methamphetamine-while heroin moved slightly up again and average
marijuana sentences increased for the first time since 1994. Moreover, in
2000, average sentences for all five drug types remained below 1992 levels,
and from thirteen to twenty-three months lower than their peak levels.
Declines of this magnitude in average sentences within every drug type
would unquestionably have reduced the overall national average drug
sentence independent of any variation in drug type mix. The overall decline
is depicted graphically in Figure 4, and numerically in Table 3.
FIGURE

4: AVERAGE
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TABLE 3: AERAGE PRISON SENTENCE, BY DRUG TYPE (MONTHS) 1 1 6
Cocaine

Crack

Meth.

Heroin

Marij.

1992
1993
1994
1995

98
96.5
94.1
89.4

121
123.1
133.4
130.7

111
106
93.1
102.1

80
72.3
76.2
63.6

50
45.4
46.5
43.1

1996
1997
1998

83.6
82.2
79.3

125.4
125
122.4

97.2
95.1
96.8

61.0
59
58.1

42.1
39
37

1999

79.1

120.3

88.8

61.6

33.7

2000

77.0

119.5

87.8

63.2

36.4

115. The data underlying Figure 4 are derived from 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 73, at
144 fig.G; 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 80, at 115 fig.K, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
32, at 123 fig.W; 1998 SOURCEBOOK, supranote 64, at 81 fig.J; 1999 SOURcEBOOK, supra note 5,
at 81 fig.J; and 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supranote 6, at 81 fig.J.
116. Id.
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In addition, if average sentences within drug type had remained
constant throughout 1992-2000 while the proportions of drug types varied as
in fact they did, all else being equal, the national average drug sentence
would have been higher in 2000 than it was in 1992."1
Although we were able to conclude in Rebellion I that changes in
proportions of drug type did not, in themselves, cause the decline in average
drug sentences between 1992 and 1999, we did not consider whether such
changes might have contributed to the decline during some intervals of the
1992-1999 study period. In Section III below, we address this issue with the
aid of district sentencing data and the addition of figures from 2000.
b.

Changes in Drug Quantity PerDefendant

Because federal drug sentences are so heavily driven by drug quantity,
average sentences would decrease if the average amount of drugs per
defendant decreased. Unfortunately, no data exactly measuring drug
quantity per defendant is available. Nonetheless, national data on drug
seizures and Sentencing Commission data on base offense levels provide
rough proxy measurements of drug quantity. As detailed in the following
two sections, both sets of data suggest that drug quantity per defendant
increased from 1992-1999. Thus, all else being equal, drug sentences should
have increased during that period.
i. Federal Drug Seizures
Data from the White House Office on Drug Policy, presented in Figure
5, reflect a 180% increase between 1992 and 1999 in the amount of drugs
seized by federal law enforcement agencies. During the same period, the
number of federal drug defendants increased by only 35%, from 16,728
offenders in 19928 to 22,682 in 1999.119 There is, at best, an imperfect
correlation between the reported quantity of federal drug seizures and the
amounts that make their way into presentence reports as the basis for a
guideline sentence.120 Nonetheless, during a period in which the amount of
117. If the average sentence for each of the five major drug types had remained constant
from 1992-2000, the changed mix in drug types during that period would have raised the overall average drug sentence from 87.74 months in 1992 to 88.82 months in 2000. For further discussion of this point, see infra note 289 and accompanying text.
118. UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, 1993 SOURCEBOOK Or FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS 56 tbl.13(1994) [hereinafter 1993 SouRCEBoOK].
119. 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 67 fig.I n.1.
120. Not every drug seizure becomes the basis for a criminal prosecution. The total quantity of drugs seized is not distributed evenly among all federal drug defendants. Not all the
drugs actually seized in connection with a case may be reported to the court. Some drugs seized
by state officers may become the basis of a federal prosecution. In so-called "reverse" cases, the
government offers to sell nonexistent drugs, the amount of which agreed to by the defendant
becomes the basis for his sentence.
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narcotics seized increased roughly four times faster than the number of drug
defendants sentenced, it is reasonable to infer that drug quantity per
defendant increased, or at least did not decline, during these same years.
FIGURE 5: TOTAL FEDERAL DRUG SEIZURES (LBS.) 121
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ii.

Base Offense Levels

A more direct measurement of drug quantity per sentenced federal
defendant is the Base Offense Level (BOL) assigned by the Guidelines to
each defendant. 22 The type and amount of drugs attributable to the
defendant pursuant to the Guidelines' relevant conduct rules determine his
base offense level. 3 Thus, base offense levels should correspond closely to
drug quantity levels, at least so long as the parties provide complete
information to the probation department and the court.1 4 The higher the

drug quantity, the higher the BOL. The higher the BOL, the higher the
resultant sentence.
Between 1992 and 1999, the overall blended BOL average in drug cases
increased by just over one full level (from a BOL of 26.31 in 1992, to a BOL
121. BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS (1995);
available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/1995/index.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2001)
(on file with the Iowa Law Review) (data drawn from U.S. Dept. Justice, Drug Enforcement
Admin., Federal-Wide Drug Seizure System). In raw numbers, federal drug seizures increased
from 1,093,366 pounds in 1992 to 2,856,462 pounds in 2000. Id.
122. The close nexus between base offense levels and drug quantity is underscored by the
U.S. Sentencing Commission's use of BOL as a proxy for drug quantity in its own reports

through 1996. 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 32, at 113-16.
123. U.S.S.G.§ 2D1.l(c) (2001).
124. If, however, the parties fail to report drug quantities accurately to probation officers
writing presentence reports, the base offense levels appearing in those reports will underrepresent the quantity of narcotics actually involved in the case. Underreporting of drug quantity is a
possible source of sentence manipulation discussed in Bowman & Heise, supra note 1, at 1122-
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of 27.33 in 1999).125 This increase was not the product of an uninterrupted
rise. Between 1992 and 1996 the average BOL increased by almost two full
126
but
levels (from a BOL of 26.31 in 1992, to a BOL of 28.24 in 1996),
between 1996 and 1999 decreased from 28.24 to 27.33, or almost one full
level. The drop in BOL between 1996 and 1999 (which will enter into the
discussion again below 127) reduced but did not erase the increase
experienced between 1992 and 1996.
The 1992-1999 increase in blended BOL average for all drug cases is
significant inasmuch as such an increase would tend to generate a higher
average drug sentence. However, the cause of an increase in blended BOL
average for all drug cases might be a changing mix of drug types within the
population of federal drug offenders, rather than of an increase in drug
quantity per defendant. To check this possibility, we examined the
movement of base offense level averages within drug type. As illustrated in
Figure 6, with the exception of marijuana, average BOLs for all major drug
types increased between 1992 and 1999. 12 As for marijuana offenders, their
average annual base offense level increased from 22.1 months in 1992 to
23.3 in 1994, and then decreased slightly over the next five years to 21.9
months.12 9 Therefore, the increase in overall average BOL from 1992-1999
seems likely to be, at least in part, a product of increased drug quantity in
cocaine, crack, methamphetamine, and heroin cases.
125. The USSC graciously supplied us with unpublished data, performed requested data
runs, and provided us unpublished BOL level data, 1992-1999, through private correspondence. E-mail from Christine Kitchens, USSC, to Michael Heise (July 21, 2001) (on file with
authors).
126. Id.
127. See infra notes 290-93 and accompanying text.
128. Specifically, BOLs for the five drug types in 1992 and 1999 were: powder cocaine, 27.4
(1992) and 28.9 (1999); crack cocaine, 28.3 (1992) and 31.2 (1999); heroin, 28.0 (1992) and
28.3 (1999); marijuana, 22.1 (1992) and 21.9 (1999); and methamphetamine, 28.7 (1992) and
30.6 (1999). Base offense level data by drug type was received by e-mail from U.S. Sentencing
Commission, supranote 125.
129. Id.
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FIGURE 6: AVERAGE BASE OFFENSE LEVEL, BY DRUG TYPE AND YEAR'3 °
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Finally, Rebellion I considered the possibility that the increase in the
overall BOL average reflected dramatic changes in the percentage of
sentences at either high or low BOLs.131 We found no such changes and
concluded that the overall increase in average base offense level for drug
offenders from 1992-1999 resulted from neither a dramatic increase in
sentences at the high BOLs nor a dramatic decrease in sentences at the low
BOLs. Rather, the overall increase in average BOL appears to flow from a
systematic increase in BOLs throughout the range of levels.
In summary, both the national drug seizure data and base offense level
data suggest that between 1992 and 1999 average drug quantity per
defendant actually increased, a factor that should have produced upward
pressure on sentence length. At the very least, data from these sources
provide no evidence supporting the hypothesis that average drug sentences
decreased because drug quantity per defendant decreased.
c.

Changes in Defendants' Role in the Offense

Although drug quantity sets the base offense level for drug offenses,
both reductions and increases in offense level are possible depending on a
defendant's role in the offense. Section 3B1.1 of the Guidelines provides for
increases of two, three, or four offense levels if a defendant plays an
"aggravating role" in cases of group criminality. 132 Conversely, § 3B1.2
130. The data underlying Figure 6 are drawn from unpublished U.S. Sentencing Commission data. See supra note 125.
131. Bowman & Heise, supra note 1, at 1092-94.
132. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 (2001). The number of levels added depends on the size and corn-
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provides that defendants in cases involving groups may receive decreases in
offense level of two, three, or four levels for "mitigating role."3 3
Consequently, average drug sentences could decrease if. (a) the average
amount of additional time imposed on defendants as a result of upward
adjustments for aggravating role decreased over time, or (b) the average
amount of sentence reduction received by defendants as a result of
downward adjustments for mitigating role increased over time.
FIGURE 7: PERCENTAGE OF ROLE ADJUSTMENTS, BYYEAR 1 4
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As Figure 7 indicates, the percentage of downward mitigating role
adjustments increased every year from 1992-1999 (from 15.9% in 1992, to
26.2% in 1999), but decreased slightly to 24.3% in 2000. Conversely, the
percentage of upward aggravating role adjustments decreased steadily from
1992-2000 (from 10.7% in 1992, to 6.5% in 2000).135 Because we are unable
to obtain precise data on the number of levels of decrease or increase
received by defendants in the mitigating and aggravating categories (i.e., did
they receive two, three, or four levels up or down), we are unable to quantify
plexity of the criminal organization and the defendant's position in it. For example, four offense levels are added if "the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that
involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive," U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 (a) (2000), while
only three levels are added if "the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but not an organizer
or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive," Id. § 3Bl.1 (b).
133. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 (2001).
134. The data underlying Figure 7 are drawn from the following sources: 1992 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 5, at 92 tbl.34; 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 141 tbl.56; 1994
ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 80, at 112 tbl.51; 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 32, at 108 tbl.44;
1996 SOURCEBOOK, supranote 58, at 51 tbl.35; 1997 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 62, at 75 tbl.40;
1998 SOURCEBOOK, supranote 64, at 75 tbl.40; 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supranote 5, at 75 tbl.40; and
2000 SOURCEBOOK, supranote 6, at 75 tbl.40.
135. Id. There was a very slight uptick from 1993-1994.
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the precise effect of this trend on average drug sentences. However, a
roughly 50% decrease in upward adjustments combined with a greater than
50% increase in downward adjustments seems likely to have lowered
sentence averages.
Just as was true with the safety valve and "super acceptance of
responsibility," changes in the proportion of cases to which aggravating and
mitigating role adjustments are applied might stem from changes in the
objective characteristics of the population of sentenced defendants or from
changes in the way prosecutors, probation officers, and judges apply the role
adjustment provisions of the Guidelines. In Rebellion I, we examined the
concededly scanty data bearing on which of the two explanations is the more
probable. We found no concrete evidence to support the hypothesis that
federal prosecutors are charging an ever-increasing percentage of low-level36
drug traffickers, and some evidence tending to undermine this hypothesis.1
On the other hand, one cannot rule out such a possibility.137 The safest
conclusion is that both discretionary and non-discretionary factors have
influenced the steady trends in aggravating and mitigating role adjustments
since 1992.
d.

Changes in CriminalHistory Category

A defendant's sentence is affected, not only by his Offense Level, which
determines his position on the vertical axis of the Guidelines' Sentencing
Table,1' 3 but also by his position on the horizontal axis of the Sentencing
Table, which is determined by his placement in one of six Criminal History
Categories. 39 Persons in Criminal History Category I have essentially no
prior criminal record, while those • in-• 140
Categories II through VI have
increasingly serious records of recidivism. An increase in criminal history
category generates a corresponding increase in sentencing range. Thus,
average drug sentences might be reduced if, over time, the government
prosecuted a population of defendants with a progressively decreasing
average criminal history score. This does not appear to have been the case.
Indeed, the trend has been in the opposite direction. From 1992 through
2000, the percentage of convicted drug defendants in Criminal History
Category I (first-time offenders) decreased from 63.1% to 56.0%."
136. Bowman & Heise, supra note 1, at 1096-100.
137. Moreover, as discussed infra notes 294-300 and accompanying text, at least during
1996-1999, prosecution trends in the Mexican border districts may support the hypothesis that
an increasing percentage of low-level drug defendants was prosecuted in that period.
138. U.S.S.G. § 5A (Sentencing Table) (2001).
139. U.S.S.G. ch. 4(A) (2001) (containing rules for determining a defendant's criminal
history score and his Criminal History Category).

140.

U.S.S.G. § 5A (Sentencing Table) (2001).

141.

The percentages of sentenced federal drug defendants in Criminal History Category I

from 1992 through 1998 were as follows: 1992: 63.1%, 1992 ANNUAL

REPORT,

supra note 5, at 93-
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Likewise, from 1992 to 2000, the average criminal history category (and thus
the average severity of drug defendants' prior criminal records) increased
from 1.79 to 2.12.142
1992_2000143
FIGURE 8: AVERAGE CRIMINAL HISTORY CATEGORY,
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Prior convictions not only increase a defendant's Criminal History
Category, but a defendant with at least two prior violent or drug trafficking
felonies may receive additional enhancements for "career offender" status
under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.14 As illustrated in Table 4, between 1992 and 2000,
both the number and percentage of drug trafficking defendants categorized
as career offenders increased.
94 tbl.35; 1993: 62.5%, 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 138 tbl.53; 1994: 59.0%, 1994
ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 80, at 109 thl.48; 1995:57.8%, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 32,
at 106 tbl.41; 1996: 55.8%, 1996 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 58, at 49 tbl.32; 1997: 57.1%, 1997
SOURCEBOOK, supranote 62, at 72 tbl.37; 1998: 56.7%, 1998 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 64, at 72
tbl.37; 1999: 55.6%, 1999 SouRCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 72 tbl.37; 2000: 56.0%, 2000
SOURCEBOOK, supranote 6, at 72 tbl. 37.
142. These figures were determined by multiplying the percentage of defendants in each
criminal history category by that category's numerical value (e.g., if 7.4% of the drug defendants sentenced in 1998 fell into Criminal History Category VI, the product of these values was
7.4 x 6), adding the resulting products from all six criminal history categories, and dividing by
one hundred. The average criminal history category from 1992 through 2000 was as follows:
1992: 1.79, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 95 tbl.35; 1993: 1.87, 1993 ANNUAL REPORT,
supranote 73, at 138 tbl.53; 1994: 1.98, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 80, at 109 tbl.48; 1995:
2.02, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 106 thl.41; 1996: 2.10, 1996 SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 58, at 49 thl.32; 1997: 2.06, 1997 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 62, at 72 tbl.37; 1998: 2.08, 1998
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 64, at 72 tbl.37; 1999: 2.12, 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 72
tbl.37; 2000: 2.12,2000 SOURcEBOOK, supranote 6, at 72 tbl.37.
143.

1&

144. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 (2001) (providing that a defendant with at least two prior convictions for crimes of violence or drug crimes shall be categorized as a "career offender," requiring
that the Criminal History Category of such offenders be Category VI, and setting enhanced
minimum offense levels for the crime of conviction).
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Table 4: Career Offenders

1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

Number of drug trafficking
defendants sentenced as
Career Offenders"'

Percentage of drug trafficking
defendants sentenced as
Career Offenders"

347
521
609
501
633
738
830
874
979

2.59
3.03
3.93
3.53
3.89
4.10
4.27
4.01
4.21

All else being equal, the upward movement in average Criminal History
Category, combined with the increase in percentage of defendants receiving
career offender enhancements, would tend to have increased, rather than
decreased, the average sentence of narcotics defendants between 1992 and
2000. 147
C. THE EFFECTOFDISCRETIONARY CHOICES ONFEDERAL DRUG SENTENCES

In Rebellion I, we discussed the effect on average drug sentence length of
eight categories of discretionary choices by sentencing actors: (1) guilty plea
rate, (2) acceptance of responsibility adjustments, (3) the position of drug
sentences within the applicable guideline range, (4) upward departures, (5)
145.
The data in the "Number of drug trafficking def's sentenced as Career Offenders"
column of Table 4 are derived from the following sources: 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5,
at 82 tbl.28; 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 73, at 95 tbl.31; 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
80, at 74 tbl.28; 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 80 tbl.26; 1996 SOURCEBOOK, supra note
58, at 37 tbl.22; 1997 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 62, at 47 tbl.22; 1998 SOURCEBOOK, supra note
64, at 47 tbl.22; 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 47 tbl.22; 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6,
at 47 tbl.22.
146.
The figures in the "Percentage of drug trafficking def's sentenced as Career Offenders" column of Table 4 are calculated by dividing the raw number of drug defendants sentenced as career offenders in the preceding column and dividing it by the number of drug trafficking defendants sentenced in that year.
147. The reader might wonder how the rise in both criminal history category and career
offender enhancements squares with the thesis advanced below, see infra notes 307-08 and accompanying text; Bowman & Heise, supranote 1, at 1130-33, that prosecutors may be exercising
their discretion to lower drug sentences. Why, one might ask, if prosecutors are manipulating
the Guidelines to produce lower sentences do they not manipulate the horizontal criminal history axis and career offender enhancements with the same facility as the vertical offense level
axis? We suggest that the answer lies in two considerations: first, the fact that the determination
of criminal history score depends on facts in the public record that are not nearly as subject to
manipulation as issues like drug quantity or role in the offense; and second, that the calculation
of criminal history is, as a matter of practice, performed almost exclusively by probation officers
with little input from the parties. Probation officers lack the institutional incentives that move
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and even judges to push for lower sentences.

HeinOnline -- 87 Iowa L. Rev. 512 2001-2002

REBELLIONII
substantial assistance downward departures, (6) non-substantial assistance
148
downward departures, (7) charge bargaining, and (8) fact bargaining.
Our findings can be summarized as follows.
1.

Guilty Plea Rates

A precondition for most discretionary methods of influencing
sentencing outcomes is a plea bargain. For example, a charge bargain in
which the government agrees to dismiss or not file a charge carrying
enhanced penalties (such as a weapons count under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c))
only occurs as part of a negotiated plea. Likewise, "fact bargains"agreements between the prosecution and defense as to the facts relevant to
sentencing which will be urged upon the probation department and the
court-can, by definition, be reached only in plea negotiations. 149 Similarly,
the government only rarely agrees to recommend a substantial assistance
departure for cooperation in the prosecution of others for a defendant who
has put the government to its proof at trial. Even a non-substantial assistance
departure, for which a government motion is not a prerequisite, is more
likely in the case of a defendant who has admitted guilt and exhibited some
measure of contrition by entering a plea than for a defendant convicted
after a trial. More subtly, a prosecutor's decision to recommend that the
court grant a "super acceptance" or mitigating role reduction, or refrain
from imposing an aggravating role enhancement, will be powerfully
influenced by whether the defendant pleads guilty. Consequently, if
sentencing system actors were, to an increasing extent, employing
discretionary means of circumventing strict application of the Guidelines,
one would expect to see a steadily increasing percentage of cases resolved by
plea rather than trial. That is what we found. As Table 5 illustrates, the guilty
plea rate for drug trafficking offenses climbed steadily from 82% in 1992 to
96.1% in 2000.
2.

Acceptance of Responsibility

The discretionary choices of the government and defendant to make,
and the court to accept, a plea agreement have a direct effect on sentence
length because the Guidelines provide a reduction in offense level of either
148. Bowman & Heise, supranote 1, at 110-05 (discussing effect of guilty plea rate); id. at
1105-07 (discussing effect of acceptance of responsibility rates); id. at 1107-08 (discussing effect
of position of sentences within the guideline range); id. at 1108-09 (discussing effect of upward
departures); id. at 1110-13 (discussing effect of substantial assistance departures); id. at 1113-16
(discussing effect of nonsubstantial assistance downward departures); i&/at 1119-22 (discussing
effect of charge bargaining); id. at 1122-24 (discussing effect of fact bargaining).
149. For discussions and critiques of fact bargaining, see Frank 0. Bowman, III, To Tell the
Truth: The Problem of Prosecutorial"Manipulation"of Sentencing Facts, 8 FED. SENTENCING REP. 324
(1996) [hereinafter Bowman, To Tell the Truth], and David Yellen, Probation Officers Look at Plea
Bargaining; andDo Not Like What They See, id. at 339.
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two or three levels for "acceptance of responsibility."'5 ° As indicated in Table
5, between 1992 and 2000 the guilty plea rate for drug offenses stayed in 5a
tight band four to six per cent above the acceptance of responsibility rate.' '
Consequently, the steady rise in guilty plea rate for drug offenses between
1992 and 2000 should, in itself, have caused some reduction in average
sentence length merely by virtue of causing an increase in acceptance of
responsibility adjustments.
TABLE

5:

GuiLTY PLEAS AND ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY
Guilty Plea Rates

Accept. Respon. Rates

82
85.3
87.8
89.8
90.2
91.9
92.5
94.2
96.1

78.1
80.9
81.8
84.6
85.5
87.1
88.5
89.7
90.1

(%)152

1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

(%)153

An even more telling indicator of the role of discretion in the plea
process and in the progressive decrease in drug sentences is the rise in
three-level "super acceptance of responsibility" adjustments under U.S.S.G. §
3E.1 (b), already discussed in some detail above.'5 4 As previously noted, the
150. U.S.S.G. § 3El.1 (1998) (providing a two-level reduction where "the defendant clearly
demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense" and a three-level reduction for defendants whose base offense level is sixteen or higher and who (a) timely provide complete information to the government about their own involvement in the offense, and (b) timely notify
authorities of their intention to plead guilty "thereby permitting the government to avoid preparing for trial, and permitting the court to allocate its resources efficiently"). For a discussion
of the 1992 Guidelines amendment adding U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 (b) providing an additional third
level of reduction for early acceptance, see supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text.
151. In addition to the data reported in Table 5, see 1996 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 58, at
62 fig.S (providing bar graph showing that acceptance of responsibility rates increased in every
drug type from 1992 through 1996).
152.
The data underlying the "Guilty Plea Rates" column of Table 5 for the period 19931999 are drawn from the following sources: 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 140 tbl.55;
1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 80, at 111 tbl.50; 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 113;
1996 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 58, at 50 tbl.33; 1997 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 62, at 73 tbl.40;
1998 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 64, at 73 tbl.38; 1999 SOURCEBOOI(, supra note 5, at 73 tbl.38;
2000 SOURCEBOOK, supranote 6, at 73 tbl.38. The figure for 1992 is from 1995 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 32, at 113.
153.
The data underlying the "Accept. Respon. Rates" column of Table 5 for the period
1993-1999 are drawn from the following sources: 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 150
tbl.60; 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 80, at 118 tbl.55; 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 32,
at 120; 1996 SOURCEBOOK, supranote 58, at 51 tbl.35; 1997 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 62, at 76
tbl.41; 1998 SOURcEBOOK, supra note 64, at 76 tbl.41; 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 76
tbl.41; 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supranote 6, at 76 tbl.41. The figure for 1992 is from 1995 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 32, at 120.
154. Supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text.
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percentage of drug cases in which at least the basic two-level form of
acceptance was awarded grew from 80.9% in 1993 (the first year "super
acceptance" was available) 5 5 to 90.1% in 2000.156 As Table 5 illustrates, this

increase tracked almost exactly the increase in guilty plea rate for that
period. During the same period, the proportion of drug cases in which
"super acceptance" was awarded increased by more than half, from 49.1% in
1993,157 to 82.1% in 2 0 0 0 .s

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that this

increase represents a change in patterns of discretionary decision-making by
sentencing system actors.
3.

Sentencing Within Range

Each intersection on the grid of the Guidelines' Sentencing Table 159 is a
range of months, the top of which is a minimum of six months and a
maximum of 25% higher than the bottom.' 6 The judge retains effectively
unfettered discretion to sentence within this range.161 In Rebellion I, we
observed two notable facts about judicial sentencing behavior for withinrange drug sentences. First, throughout the Guidelines period, judges have
sentenced the overwhelming majority of drug defendants sentenced within
range at or near the bottom of the range. 162 Second, although it is difficult
to be precise because the Sentencing Commission changed the way it
reports statistics on within-range sentences in 1997,163 the available evidence
suggests that from 1992 through 2000 judges sentenced an increasing
percentage of drug defendants to the low end of the applicable guideline
155.
156.

1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 73, at 150 tbl.60.
2000 SOURCEBOOK, supranote 6, at 76 tbl.41.

157.
158.
159.
160.

1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 73, at 150 tbl.60.
2000 SOURCEBOOK, supranote 6, at 76 tblA1.
U.S.S.G. § 5A (2000).
This ratio is set by statute. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b) (2) (1994).

161. Bowman & Heise, supranote 1, at 1058(emphasis deleted).
162. For example, in 1993, 72.7% of all drug defendants were sentenced within the lowest
one-quarter of the applicable guideline range. 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 165
tbl.67. In 1999, 71.2% of drug trafficking defendants were sentenced at the absolute bottom of
the applicable range, and 81.2% were sentenced below the midpoint in the range. 1999
SOURcEBOOK, supra note 5, at 59 tbl.29. (The Sentencing Commission changed its method of
reporting sentences within range in 1997.) See Alex Kosinski, CarthageMust Be Destroyed, 12 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 67, 67 (1999), in which Judge Kosinski of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit describes his experiences as a trial judge: "Once I have figured out the
range, I always sentence at the very bottom. ... " Id.
163. From 1993-1996, the Sentencing Commission reported the percentage of defendants
sentenced within each quartile of the sentencing range. See 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note

73, at 165 tbl.67. Beginning in 1997, the Commission stopped providing figures by quartile, and
instead reported the percentage of defendants sentenced to: (a) the minimum possible sentence within the range, (b) between the minimum and the midpoint in the range; (c) the midpoint in the range; (d) between the midpoint and the maximum possible sentence in the
range; and (e) the maximum possible sentence within the range. See 1997 SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 62, at 59 tbl.29.
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range. From 1992 to 1996, the number of drug trafficking defendants
sentenced within the lowest quartile of the applicable sentencing range
increased from 70% to 74.8%.' 64 From 1997 to 2000, the number of drug
trafficking defendants sentenced to the minimum possible sentence within
the applicable range increased from 65.9% to 71.7%.165
A complementary trend appears at the high end of the guideline range.
From 1992 to 1996, the percentage of drug trafficking defendants sentenced
in the highest quartile of the application guideline range dropped from
11% to 9.2%.'6 From 1997 to 2000, the number of drug trafficking
defendants sentenced to the maximum possible sentence within the
applicable range declined from 10.8% to 9.7%.
4.

Upward Departures

Once a sentencing judge has determined a defendant's offense level
and criminal history category, and thus established the defendant's
sentencing range, the judge may nonetheless, under certain circumstances,
impose a sentence above or below the range. A sentence outside the
applicable guideline range is a "departure."168 An "upward departure" is a
sentence higher than the top of the applicable guideline range. A
"downward departure" is a sentence below the bottom of the applicable
guideline range. The number of upward departures for all types of crimes
sentenced under the Guidelines has always been very small. For example, in
1990, only 2.3% of all defendants received upward departures. 169 From 19922000, both the rate and absolute number of upward departures in drug cases
started out small and declined almost to the vanishing point. As Table 6
164. The percentage of drug trafficking defendants sentenced within the lowest quartile of
the applicable sentencing range from 1993 to 1996 was as follows: 1992: 70%, 1992 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 5, at 132 tbl.52; 1993: 72.7%, 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 165
tbl.67; 1994: 72.9%, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 80, at 87 tbl.34; 1995: 74.5%, 1995
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 92 tbl.32; 1996: 74.8%, 1996 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 58, at
44 tbl.27. The figures in the Commission reports for this period are expressed as percentages of
the entire group of drug trafficking defendants sentenced within the reporting year, rather
than as a percentage of defendants sentenced within range. However, the conversion to percentage of all defendants sentenced within range within a given quartile is easily accomplished.
165. The percentages of drug defendants sentenced to the Guideline minimum from 19972000 were as follows: 1997: 65.9%, 1997 SOURCEBOOK, supranote 62, at 59 tbl.29; 1998: 68.79%,
1998 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 64, at 59 tbl.29; 1999: 71.2%, 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at
59 tbl.29; 2000: 71.7%, 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 59 tbl.29.
166. 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 5, at 132 tbl.52; 1996 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 58, at
44 tbl.27.
167. The percentage of drug trafficking defendants sentenced at the top of the applicable
Guideline range from 1997 to 1999 was as follows 1997: 10.8%, 1997 SOURCEBOOK, supra note
62, at 59 tbl.29; 1998: 10.1%, 1998 SOURCEBOOK, supranote 64, at 59 tbl.29; 1999: 9.4%, 1999
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 59 tbl.29; 2000: 9.7%, 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 59
tbl.29.
168. See generally U.S.S.G. ch. 5K (2001) (governing departures).
169. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT 74, tbl.S (1991).
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illustrates, the rate of upward departures in drug cases was 0.6% in 1992 and
declined steadily to 0.2% in 1999 and 2000.17° By 1999, only 38 out of 21,942
drug defendants, or one in every 577 persons sentenced for drug crimes,
received an upward departure.17 ' To the extent that upward departures
represent one manifestation ofjudicial opinion about the relative severity of
Guidelines sentences for various crime types, it is worth noting that the rate
of upward departures in non-drug cases has consistently stayed three to five
times higher than in drug cases.
TABLE 6: UPWARD DEPARTURES

1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

5.

Upward Depart.

Upward Depart.

(Non-Drug) (%)'n

(Drug Cases) (%),73

2.0
1.6
1.6
1.3
1.4
1.2
1.1
0.6
0.9

0.6
0.5
0.6
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2

Substantial Assistance Departures

Substantial assistance departures are departures below the otherwise
applicable guideline range granted by the sentencing judge on motion of
the government to defendants who have "provided substantial assistance in
the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an
offense." 174 When we speak of "substantial assistance departures" we include
170. 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 80 tbl.45; 2000 SOURcEBOOK, supra note 6, at 80
tbl.45.
171. 1999 SOURcEOOK, supranote 5, at 80, tbl.45.
172.
The data in the "Upward Depart. (Non-Drug)" column of Table 6 are drawn from
1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 90 tbl.33, 127 tbl.50; 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
73, at 143 tbls.58, 156; 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 80, at 83 tbl.33, 113 tbl.53; 1995
ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 32, at 89 tbl.31, 109 tbl.46; 1996 SOURCEBOOK, supranote 58, at 41
tbl.26, 55 tbl.40; 1997 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 62, at 53 tbl.26, 80 tbl.45; 1998 SOURCEBOOK,
supranote 64, at 63 tbl.32, 80 tbl.45; and 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supranote 5, at 63 tbl.32, 80 tbl.45.
173.
The data in the "Upward Depart. (Drug Cases)" column of Table 6 for the period
1993-98 are drawn from the following sources: 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 73, at 143
tbl.58; 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 80, at 113 tbl.53; 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 32,
at 109 thl.46; 1996 SOURCEBOOK, supranote 58, at 55 tbl.40; 1997 SOURCEBOOK, supranote 62,
at 80 tbl.45; 1998 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 64, at 80 tbl.45; 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at
80 tbl.45; 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 80 tbl.45. The figure for 1992 is from 1995
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 120.
174. 28 U.S.C. §994(a) (1994). For more comprehensive discussions of the law and procedure of substantial assistance motions, see HAINEs, BOWMAN & WOLL, supra note 79, at 1264-97;
Bowman & Heise, supra note 1, at 1110-13; Frank 0. Bowman, In, DepartinglsSuch Sweet Son-ow:
A Year ofJudicialRevolt on "SubstantialAssistance"DeparturesFollows a Decade ofProsecutorialIndiscipline, 29 STETSON L. REv. 7 (1999); and Frank 0. Bowman, Ill, Defending SubstantialAssistance:
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both departures from the statutory minimum mandatory sentence pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 3553, and to departures below the otherwise applicable
guideline range pursuant to § 5KI.1.
As Table 7 illustrates, since 1993, between one in three and one in four
federal drug defendants has received a substantial assistance departure. 75
Even more strikingly, from 1992-2000 the rate of substantial assistance
departures in drug cases consistently remained roughly triple that for all
other crimes.
TABLE 7: PERCENTAGE OF CASES RECEIVING SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE
DEPARTURES

1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

Sub. Assist. Depart.
(Non-Drug Cases) (%)176
8.1
8.8
10.6
11.5
11.2
11.6
11.3
10.4
10.9

Sub. Assist. Depart.
(Drug Cases) (%)M
24
27.2
31.7
31.9
30.6
30.6
30.1
28.5
27.1

An Old Prosecutor'sMeditation on Singleton, Sealed Case, and the Maxfield-Kramer Repor 12 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 45 (1999).
175. The percentages in Table 7 understate the frequency of substantial assistance reductions because, although the Sentencing Commission only counts substantial assistance reductions accomplished at the time of the original sentencing through § 5K1.1 motions, a number
of districts commonly grant these reductions only aflersentencing under Rule 35, FED. R. CRIM.
P. See Linda Drazga Maxfield & John H. Kramer, Substantial Assistance: An Empirical Yardstick
Gauging Equity in CurrentFederalPolicy and Practice,UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 5
n.11 (1998) (noting that Rule 35(b) data is not collected, but estimating that Rule 35(b) motions occur in roughly 500 cases per year).
176.
The data in the "Sub. Assist. Depart. (Non-Drug Cases)" column of Table 7 are drawn
from the following sources: 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 127 tbl.50 and 132 tbl.52;
1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 80, at 83 tbl.33 and 113 tbl.53; 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 32, at 89 tbl.31 and 109 tbl.46; 1996 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 58, at 41 tbl.26 and 55 tbl.40;
1997 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 62, at 56 tbl.27; 1998 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 64, at 56 tbl.27;
1999 SOURCEBOOK, supranote 5, at 56 tbl.27; 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supranote 6, at 56 tbl.27.
177.
The data in the "Sub. Assist. Depart. (Drug Cases)" column of Table 7 for the period
1993-2000 are drawn from the following sources: 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 73, at 143
tbl.58; 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 80, at 113 tbl.53; 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 32,
at 109 tbl.46; 1996 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 58, at 55 tbl.40; 1997 SOURCEBOOK, supranote 62,
at 80 tbl.45; 1998 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 64, at 80 tbl.45; 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at
56 tbl.27; 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 56 tbl.27. The figure for 1992 is from 1995
ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 32, at 120.
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The very high percentage of substantial assistance departures in
narcotics cases has undoubtedly been a significant factor in holding down
average drug sentences throughout 1992-2000. In addition, the 7.7%
increase in drug case substantial assistance departures from 24% of all drug
defendants in 1992178 to 31.7% in 19949 was likely a contributing factor in
the decline in average drug sentences in that two-year period.
Nonetheless, substantial assistance departures do not appear to have
contributed to the continuing decrease in average drug sentences after
1994. First, as illustrated in Table 7, between 1994 and 2000, the proportionof
drug defendants to whom substantial assistance departures were awarded
actually fell, from 31.7% in 1994180 to 27.1% in 2000.181 Second, as illustrated

in Table 8, between 1995 and 2000, the average size of substantial assistance
departures also decreased. From 1993 to 1995, the average substantial
assistance departure in a drug trafficking case increased in length from 48
months to 51 months. In 1996, the average substantial assistance departure
declined to 46 months, and in 1997, dropped nine months to 37 months.
Since 1997, the size of substantial assistance departures has held roughly
steady (37 months in 1998, 38 months in 1999 and 2000). However,
expressed as a percentage of the low end of the otherwise applicable
guideline range, the size of substantial assistance departures has dropped
steadily since 1994 (from 53.8% in 1994 to 47.8% in 2000).
We have no definitive explanation for the decrease in the average size
of substantial assistance departures in drug cases. However, the trend is
consistent with anecdotal information suggesting that U.S. Attorney's Offices
and district judges are increasingly adopting standardized local practices
regarding the size of substantial assistance departures. Such local practices
tend to create customary discounts for substantial assistance, expressed as a
percentage of the bottom of the otherwise applicable guideline range.182
178. 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 32, at 120.
179. 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 80, at 113 tbl.53.
180. Id.
181. 2000 SOURcEBOOK, supranote 6, at 80 tbl.45.
182. See United States v. Cosgrove, 73 F.3d 297, 302 (11th Cir. 1996) (approving district
judge's announced practice of awarding a standard substantial assistance reduction of one-third
off the low end of the applicable Guidelines range); United States v. King, 53 F.3d 589, 591-92
(3d Cir. 1995) (describing district court's practice of reducing sentence of cooperators under §
5K1.1 by three levels by analogy to acceptance of responsibility reduction).
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TABLE 8: SIZE OF SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE DEPARTURES IN DRUG TRAFFICKING
ls
3
CASES

1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

Size of Sub. Assist. Depart.
(in months)
48
50
51
46
37
37
38
38

Size of Sub. Assist. Depart.
(% of Guideline minimum)
53.2
53.8
53.3
50
49.6
48.6
48.5
47.8

6. Non-Substantial Assistance Departures Under § 5K2.0
"Non-substantial assistance" departures are those awarded pursuant to §
5K2.0 of the Guidelines.'8 Ajudge may depart either upward or downward
from the otherwise applicable guideline range if the court finds "that there
exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree,
not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
formulating the guidelines. " a1 As shown in Table 9, the percentage of
downward departures in drug cases pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 increased
steadily from 1992-1999. Intriguingly, in 2000, the percentage of nonsubstantial assistance drug departures fell for the first time, from 15.3% to
14.7%. Moreover, in 2000, again for the first time, the § 5K2.0 departure
rates for drug cases and all cases diverged by more than about a single
percentage point, with the general rate rising to 17%.
183. The data in Table 8 on the size of substantial assistance departures in months and as a
percentage of the otherwise applicable Guideline range from 1993 to 1996 are taken from Sentencing Commission figures provided in a fax to Frank Bowman from Courtney Semisch, U.S.
Sentencing Commission (Apr. 18, 2000) (on file with author). The data in Table 8 for 19972000 are drawn from 1997 SOURCEBOOK, supranote 62, at 61 tbl.30; 1998 SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 64, at 61 tbl.30; 1999 SOURCEBOOK,supranote 5, at 61 tbl.30; and 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 6, at 61 tbl.30.
184. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (2001).
185. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2001)).
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TABLE

9:

NON-SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE DEPARTURES

Down. Depart.
Sec. 5K2.0
(Drug Cases) (%)...
6.3
6.5
7.2
8.4
9.1
12.0
12.8
15.3
14.7

1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

Down. Depart.
Sec. 5K2.0
(All Cases) (%) '"
6.0
6.6
7.6
8.4
10.3
12.1
13.6
15.8
17.0

As we observed in Rebellion I, the Supreme Court's 1996 decision in Koon
v. United States

may have encouraged district judges to depart even more

than had previously been the case, thus perpetuating a trend of ever-greater
numbers of non-substantial assistance departures that had been under way
since 1992.189 It is too early to tell what the 2000 drop in both substantial

assistance

and

non-substantial

Nonetheless, the two trends in

assistance

departures

may

portend.

tandem may provide some part of the

explanation for the fact that, although the national average drug sentence

fell again in 2000, it did so by only a tiny margin. 190

7.
Prosecutors

Charge Bargains

can use their discretionary charging power to reduce

sentences. Charge bargaining may take the form of charging or accepting a
plea to an offense less serious than the defendant's conduct would support,

or to fewer counts than the government could actually prove, thus in theory
subjecting the defendant to liability for only a limited subset of all his

criminal

conduct. The Guidelines do

not explicitly prohibit charge

186.
The data in the "Down. Depart. Sec. 5K2.0 (Drug Cases)" column of Table 9 for the
period 1993-2000 are drawn from the following sources: 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 73, at
143 tbl.58; 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 80, at 113 tbl.53; 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote
32, at 109 tbl.46; 1996 SouRcEBOOK, supranote 58, at 55 tbl.40; 1997 SOURCEBOOK, supranote
62, at 80 tbl.45; 1998 SOURCEBOOK, supranote 64, at 80 tbl.45; 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5,
at 80 tbl.5; 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 80 tbl.5. The figure for 1992 is from 1995
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 120.
187.
The data in the "Down. Depart. Sec. 5K2.0 (All Cases)" column of Table 9 for the period 1993-1998 are drawn from the 1998 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 64, at 51 fig.G. The figures
for 1999 and 2000 are from 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at 80 tbl.5; 2000 SOURCEBOOK,
supra note 6, at 80 thl.5. The figure for 1992 is from 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 32, at 86
fig. H.
188. 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
189. Bowman & Heise, supranote 1, at 1114-16.
190. See 2000 SOURcEBOOK, supra note 26, at 32 (showing a decline in average drug sentence from 75.2 months in 1999 to 74.4 months in 2000).
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bargaining. However, the relevant conduct feature of the Guidelines is
designed to nullify the effect of such bargains. 91 As a result, the judge is to
sentence each defendant for everything he actually did in relation to the
course of criminal conduct that led to his conviction, regardless of the
specific offense to which he pled guilty. The judge is to include both
uncharged and acquitted conduct, if proven at sentencing by a
preponderance of the evidence. 192
If the sentencing judge has full information about the case, i.e., all the
facts about the entire course of conduct that resulted in the defendant's
conviction, charge bargaining should influence the sentence only if the
statutory maximum sentence for the bargained-for offense is less than the
Guidelines sentence for the same course of conduct. Because of the high
statutory maximum sentences for drug crimes, charge bargaining often will
have little effect in drug cases. By way of illustration, assume a defendant
sold one kilogram of cocaine to Buyer X the first week of the month, and
then sold five kilos to Buyer X each of the remaining three weeks in the
month. The government could choose to charge him with only one count of
distribution of one kilo, but even if it did so, the judge would still be obliged
to calculate the defendant's offense level based on all sixteen kilos because
the entire month's transactions were plainly part of the "same course of
conduct or common scheme or plan." 93 The Guidelines dictate a sentence
of at least 151-188 months (about twelve to fifteen years) for distribution of
sixteen kilos of cocaine. Therefore, because the statutory maximum
sentence for a single count of cocaine distribution is twenty years,194 a plea to
a single count will not cap the sentence below the guideline range.
Nonetheless, charge bargains can be structured to reduce sentences for
some drug defendants, even if the judge has full information. In Rebellion I,
we described several types of charge bargains. These included promising to
dismiss (or not to file) a weapon count under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), thus
sparing the defendant a five-year addition to his sentence; 95 promising not
191. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, the sentencingjudge is required to take into account in
setting the base offense level and all adjustments "all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant," U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.3(a)(1) (A) (2000), as well as all the foreseeable acts of his co-conspirators, U.S.S.G. §
1B1.3(a) (1)(B) (2000), that occurred in relation to the offense of conviction or as "part of the
same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(A) (2)
(2000) (emphasis added). For further discussion of relevant conduct, see William W. Wilkins,Jr.
&John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone of the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L.
REV. 495 (1990).
192.
See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997) (holding relevant conduct includes
acquitted conduct proven by a preponderance of evidence at sentencing); HAINES, BOWMAN &
WOLL, supranote 79, at 118 ("All circuits agree that relevant conduct includes uncharged conduct outside the offense of conviction.").
193. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2) (2000).
194. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (1994).
195. For a discussion of the operation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), see supra notes 89-105 and ac-
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to file a "second offender information," which is a pleading triggering
doubled penalties when a defendant has been convicted of a prior felony
drug offense;196 agreeing to dismiss or not file a charge of "engaging in a
continuing criminal enterprise" (CCE) under 21 U.S.C. § 848197 (which
carries a minimum mandatory penalty of twenty years imprisonment) in lieu
of a plea to another drug offense with a lower penalty; or substituting for
substantive drug offenses a plea to use of a communication facility to carry
out a drug trafficking offense under 21 U.S.C. § 843(b), an offense with a
statutory maximum sentence of four years known as a "phone count."
In Rebellion I, we noted statistical indicators tending to establish the
existence of charge bargains in drug cases involving second offender
informations19" and phone counts.) In June 2000, the Bureau of Justice
Statistics published a study offering persuasive evidence that charge bargains
involving dismissal of a § 924(c) weapons count became increasingly
frequent between 1992 and 1998.200 Although the study lumped together
both drug and non-drug § 924(c) cases, its results are nonetheless
suggestive. The percentage of cases in which a § 924(c) count was charged,
but dismissed as part of a plea agreement, nearly tripled from 24.4% in 1992
to 65.7% in 1996.201 In 1997-1998, the percentage of such bargains
decreased to 56.1% and 54.3% respectively, but the rate remained double
that prevailing in 1992.202 The fact that charge bargains dismissing § 924(c)
counts peaked in 1996, the year following the December 1995 decision in
Bailey v. United States,20 3 may have been a response to that case. Nonetheless,
in 1995, § 924(c) counts were dismissed in fully 50.3% of all cases in which
they were charged, and in 1997 and 1998, § 924(c) counts were dismissed in
56.1% and 54.3% of all cases in which they were charged. 0 4
All this having been said, despite solid evidence of the existence of
charge bargaining and some evidence suggesting that the prevalence of
charge bargains in drug cases with § 924(c) counts rose substantially
companying text.
196.

21U.S.C.§ 841(b)(1)(A) (1994).

197. A defendant commits the crime of "engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise"
when: (a) he commits a felony narcotics crime in violation of Title 21, United States Code, (b)
that violation is part of a "continuing series of violations" undertaken by the defendant in concert with at least five other persons "with respect to whom [the defendant] occupies a managerial or supervisory position," and (c) the defendant "obtains substantial income or resources"
from the enterprise. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c) (1994).
198. Bowman & Heise, supra note 1, at 1121.
199. Id. at 1121-22.
200. BJS FIREARM REPORT, supranote 95.
201. Id. at 6, tbl.5.
202. Id.
203. 516 U.S. 137 (1995). For discussion of the Bailey case, see supra notes 89-105 and accompanying text.
204. BJS FmEAIai REPORT, supranote 95, at 6 tbl.5
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between 1992 and 1996, we are unable to quantify the frequency of charge
bargaining in drug cases or its quantitative effect on average drug sentences.
8.

Fact Bargaining

The most direct method of evading a fact-driven real offense sentencing
system is for the parties to conceal (or for the court to turn a blind eye to)
facts that would increase the sentence beyond the agreed upon level. °5
While no experienced observer doubts that fact bargaining occurs, there is
considerable controversy over its frequency. 206 The debate is peculiarly
difficult to resolve because fact bargains are entered into for the express
purpose of keeping facts from the probation department and the sentencing
judge, and thus out of the record. The Sentencing Guidelines are a selfcontained system. That is, if a sentencing judge finds Fact A to exist, and if
the Guidelines dictate certain sentencing consequences upon a finding of
Fact A, then those consequences must follow and both Fact A and its
consequences will appear in the record and can be tabulated by Sentencing
Commission researchers. Conversely, if Fact A exists, but is suppressed by
the parties pursuant to a plea agreement, its existence will be reflected
nowhere except the files of the prosecutor. The suppressed fact will
therefore not appear in the presentence report, will not be reported to the
Sentencing Commission, and will thus remain invisible to researchers.
In Rebellion I, we were able to offer only anecdotal evidence and opinion
survey evidence regarding the existence and prevalence of fact bargaining. 207
We have found no lode of additional data in the intervening months. Thus,
we are still unable to say more than that some fact bargaining undoubtedly
does occur in federal drug cases and that the effect of such bargains is to
reduce some sentences. It is, however, impossible to quantify the frequency
of this practice or the magnitude of the effect on average drug sentences.
Nor is it possible to determine whether fact bargaining has become more or
less common over time.
205. See Yellen, supra note 145, at 340 (describing "fact bargaining and guideline-factor
bargaining" as "the surest way to influence the sentence of a defendant who pled guilty").
206. Compare Letter of Francesca D. Bowman, Chair, First Circuit, Probation Officers Advisory Group, to Richard P. Conaboy, Chairman, United States Sentencing Commission (Jan. 30,
1996), 8 FED. SENTENCING REP. 303 (1996) (reporting result of survey in which many probation
officers expressed the opinion that prosecutors commonly withheld facts from the Probation
Department, and thus from the sentencing judge "to protect a plea agreement") (Ms. Bowman
is no relation to the author of this Article), with Bowman, To Tell the Truth, supra note 145, passim (questioning whether the phenomenon of fact bargaining was widespread).
207. Bowman & Heise, supra note 1, at 1122-24.
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REBELLION I: A

SUMMARY

1. Summary of Non-Discretionary Factors Affecting Average Drug Sentence
Length
The non-discretionary factors we have been able to identify do not
appear to provide an adequate explanation for the decline in average
federal drug sentence length between 1991-1992 and 2000. Moreover, those
non-discretionary factors that have had the greatest probable effect prove,
on closer examination, to have a significant discretionary component.
First, statutory penalties for federal drug offenses have, with a single
exception, increasedsince 1988.208 The sole exception was the statutory safety
valve passed in 1994, which, standing alone, had no immediate observable
downward effect on drug sentences. 209 However, the Sentencing
Commission's passage of a Guidelines safety valve provision in 1995 was
followed immediately in 1996 by a decrease in drug sentences. 210 The
modest increases in percentage of cases to which the statutory and
guidelines safety valves were applied in 1997 through 2000 make it unlikely
that these safety valves had a significant direct role in the reductions in
average sentence that occurred in those years. 2n Nonetheless, by eliminating
the constraint of mandatory minimum sentences in 23.2% of cases by
2000,212 the statutory safety valve permitted the application of other
Guidelines provisions, some having discretionary aspects, that certainly
lowered many drug sentences.
Second, between 1991 and 2000, the Sentencing Commission adopted a
number of amendments to the drug guidelines, some of which increased
and some of which decreased drug sentences. Although we are unable to
quantify the net effect of these amendments on average drug sentences, it is
fair to conclude that, taken as a group, these Guidelines amendments have
only a weak explanatory connection to the continuing decline in drug
sentences. With the exception of the guideline safety valve (considered in
the preceding paragraph on statutory changes) and the "super acceptance
of responsibility" credit,213 the amendments lowering sentences would have
affected only a small number of cases. 2 14 Each amendment would have had
its greatest effect on the overall average drug sentence in the year following
208. Supranotes 29-31 and accompanying text.
209.
Supranotes 32-45 and accompanying text.
210. Supranote 59 and accompanying text.
211. Supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
212. 2000 SOURcEBOOK, supranote 6, at 79 tbl.44.
213. Supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text.
214. Bowman & Heise, supranote 1, at 1076-77 (discussing small number of cases affected
by the elimination of top two levels of drug quantity table), and id. at 1078-80 (discussing small
number of cases affected by amendments relating to amendments on "mixture or substance" in
which drugs are found and on the definition of relevant conduct in a drug conspiracy).
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its adoption, with little measurable impact on the overall average in ensuing
years. Yet all the amendments we have identified with a potential to push
average sentences down were enacted from 1993-1995, and would have
taken effect no later than 1996.215 Thus, these amendments cannot help
explain the continuing decline in average sentence in 1997-2000.
Additionally, the downward pressure exerted by some Guidelines
amendments would have been counteracted by other amendments
(particularly those involving methamphetamine enacted between 1995 and
1997216) that increased drug sentences.
Third, there have been only two Supreme Court decisions altering case
law in ways that would tend to reduce federal drug sentences, the 1995 Bailey
217
decision interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and the 1996 Koon decision on
departures. 2 1s There was a marked decrease in cases with "weapon
involvement" in the two years following Bailey, but the decline leveled off in
1998.219 Whatever effect Bailey may have had on the overall average federal
drug sentence, it cannot explain the decline between 1991-1992 and 1995,
and can have, at best, a tenuous connection to the continued decline
between 1997 and 2000. Moreover, the decline in cases with sentences
involving weapon enhancements may be in part attributable to discretionary
prosecutorial choices during the charging and plea bargaining phases of the
process. The effect of the Koon decision is discussed below as a discretionary
factor, because its essence was an encouragement of discretionary choice to
depart.
Fourth, we continue to have a high degree of confidence that the
change in mix of drug type for which defendants were sentenced during
1992-2000 did not in itself cause the decline in sentence length during this
period. Most importantly, the average sentence for each of the major drug
types was lower in 2000 than it was in 1992.220 Likewise, if average sentence
lengths within drug type had remained constant at 1992 levels, all else being
equal, the overall average drug sentence would have been longer in 2000
than it was in 1992. Nonetheless, we no longer feel confident in asserting,
as we did in Rebellion I, that the change in mix of drug types between 19921999 "did not contribute to the decline in average federal narcotics
sentence. " 22 A re-examination of the national data, in conjunction with our
study of district and regional data, leads us to the conclusion that, at least
215.
216.
217.
ing text
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. at 1080 n.150.
Id. at 1080-82.
Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 143 (1995); see also notes 89-105 and accompany(discussing effects of Bailey decision on sentence length in drug cases).
Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 93 (1996).
Supra note 101 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
Supra note 117 and accompanying text.
Bowman & Heise, supra note 1, at 1103 (emphasis added).
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during the period 1996-1999, large increases in the number of marijuana
prosecutions in the Mexican border districts, acting in conjunction with the
"fast track" sentencing policies adopted in drug prosecutions on the border,
may well have contributed to the declining
national average sentence. We
223
below.
detail
in
issue
this
discuss
will
Fifth, to the extent we have been able to determine it, the average
quantity of drugs per sentenced defendant increased from 1993-1999. More
conservatively, there is no evidence that the average quantity of drugs per
sentenced defendant decreased. 224 Thus, there is no evidence that changes
in drug quantity caused the decrease in average drug sentences.
Sixth, the steady rise in percentage of mitigating role adjustments from
1992-1999, combined with the steady decline in aggravating role adjustments
in the same period, certainly contributed to the overall decrease in average
drug sentence in that period. (In 2000, the decline in aggravating role
adjustments continued, but mitigating role adjustments decreased slightly as
well2 a) In Rebellion I, we concluded tentatively that "these complementary
trends are more likely to have been the result of evolutionary changes in
discretionary judicial and prosecutorial behavior than of real changes in the
226
population of defendants upon whom the Guidelines were operating."
Again, analysis of regional data has made us a bit less sure of this already
tentative conclusion. 227 Now we think it safer to say that both changes in
defendant population and discretionary choices by sentencing actors have
probably influenced the trends in role adjustments for drug offenders.
Seventh, between 1993 and 2000, the number of first-time offenders
prosecuted for federal drug crimes decreased, the seriousness of the prior
criminal records of federal drug defendants grew progressively worse, and
the number and percentage of drug defendants classified as career
offenders increased. 2 28 These trends would, if anything, have increased
average narcotics sentences.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, all of the "non-discretionary"
factors with the largest probable downward effect on overall drug sentence
average have markedly discretionary components. The implementation of
the statutory and guideline safety valves, the award of two- and three-level
acceptance of responsibility reductions, the choice of whether to file and
pursue gun charges and enhancements, and the steady alteration in role
adjustments (aggravating role down, mitigating role up) are all subject to
significant influence from the discretionary choices of judges, prosecutors,
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Infranotes 287-302 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 118-30 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
Bowman & Heise, supranote 1, at 1103.
Infra Part III.
Supranotes 139-48 and accompanying text.
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and defendants. And, as noted, the Koon decision is an invitation to
229
increased exercise ofjudicial sentencing discretion.
2.

Summary of Discretionary Factors Affecting Average Sentence Length

In the aggregate, the discretionary factors discussed above have
certainly exerted a powerful downward influence on average drug sentences
in the years since 1992.
First, the increase in percentage of federal drug cases disposed of by
plea from 82% in 1992 to 96.1% in 2000230 would, in itself, have tended to

reduce average sentence length because virtually all defendants who plead
guilty receive a two or three level reduction for "acceptance of
responsibility" under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. 23 1 Moreover, a negotiated plea is a
necessary precondition for the exercise of other discretionary choices by
prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges that can produce far larger
sentence reductions. At the very least, the consistent increase in pleas is
suggestive of an environment increasingly hospitable to such exercises of
discretion.
Second, the dramatic rise in so-called "super acceptance of
responsibility" adjustments (the subtraction of a third offense level for those
defendants receiving the regular acceptance reduction who also plead guilty
early and provide full information about their crime 232), from 49.1% in 1993
to 82.1% in 2000,233 would likely have reduced the average length of drug

sentences and is strongly indicative of an increasingly lenient exercise of
discretion by prosecutors and judges.
Third, although the data is not conclusive, our research strongly
suggests that between 1992 and 2000 judges sentenced an increasing
percentage of drug defendants to the low end of the applicable guideline
range. 234
Fourth, the number of upward departures in drug cases, tiny to begin
with, decreased even further throughout the period 1992-2000.235

Fifth, throughout the period 1992-2000, the rate at which prosecutors
recommended and judges awarded substantial assistance departures in drug
cases increased at a rate roughly triple that of all other types of cases." The
rate of substantial assistance departures was sufficiently high to support an
inference that such departures were commonly being used, not to secure
needed evidence, but as tools of case management or sentence
229.
230.

Supra notes 87, 118, 189, and accompanying text.
2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 73 tbl.38.

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text.
2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 76 tbl.41.
Supra notes 159-67 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
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manipulation. However, although the rate of substantial assistance
departures increased markedly between 1992 and 1994-rising from 24% to
31.7%-it then leveled off.23 7 Indeed, the drug case substantial assistance
rate actually declined from 1995 to 2000, dropping from 31.9% to 27.1%.238
Between 1993 and 1995, the evidence suggests that the size of substantial
assistance departures increased; however, the size of such departures
decreased from 1995 to 1999, both in number of months and as a
percentage of the otherwise applicable Guidelines minimum sentence. 239
Accordingly, the continuing high percentage of substantial assistance
departures kept average drug sentences down throughout the study period.
Similarly, the increase in the number of substantial assistance departures
between 1992 and 1995, and in the size of such departures from 1993
through 1995, probably contributed to the decline in average drug sentence
in those periods. Nonetheless, we conclude, somewhat to our surprise, that
substantial assistance has no observable causal connection to the decrease in
average drug sentences between 1995 and 2000.
Sixth, by contrast, non-substantial assistance departures under U.S.S.G.
§ 5K2.0 more than doubled in drug cases from 6.3% in 1992 to 15.3% in
1999, with a slight decline to 14.7% in 2000.2 40 This increase was doubtless
encouraged by the Supreme Court's 1996 decision in Koon v. United States,
but the trend substantially predates Koon. The markedly increased use of
non-substantial assistance downward departures was purely discretionary in
character and undoubtedly contributed to the reduction in average drug
sentences up through 1999.
Finally, our study supports the conclusion that prosecutors employ both
charge and fact bargaining to confer sentencing discounts on some
242
defendants. 241 However, despite the prevalence of anecdotal information,
there is insufficient data to determine empirically whether the incidence of
charge and fact bargaining increased between 1992 and 2000.
3. The Combined Effect of Discretionary and Non-Discretionary Factors on
Federal Drug Sentences
In light of our findings on discretionary and non-discretionary factors, it
seems clear that an important, and perhaps dominant, mechanism driving
the 1992-1999 decrease in drug sentence length was a steady increase in
discretionary choices by system actors to shorten sentences. The figures for
2000 are mixed in this regard, with some mechanisms of discretionary
237. Id. The rate of substantial assistance departures stayed essentially flat in 1994-1995,
changing by only 0.2%, from 31.7% in 1994 to 31.9% in 1995. Id.
238. Id.
239. Supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
240. Supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
241. Supra Part HI.B.7.
242. Id.
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leniency rising and others declining for the first time since the early 1990s.
We are aware that our conclusions so far are subject to the critique that
we did not test the interactions of the many factors bearing on drug
sentence length with statistical tools such as regression analysis. We are
somewhat skeptical that one could gather the quantity and quality of data
that would be necessary to perform such an analysis, at least if the objective
were to analyze all the factors we have identified as potentially relevant for
all 150,000-plus drug defendants sentenced in the period 1992-2000. We are
also skeptical of the feasibility of creating a statistical model that would
produce useful results in a nine-year longitudinal study of a system in which
the legal rules and other factors affecting outcomes are constantly changing.
At any event, we did not undertake this formidable task, either in Rebellion I
or in this Article. Although one of us (Heise) is trained as an empirical social
scientist, in Rebellion I our approach to ferreting out the cause of declining
drug sentences was the approach of the trial lawyer, not of the statistician.
That is, we examined, one by one, each of the likely discretionary and nondiscretionary factors that might affect average drug sentence length. The
evidence we reviewed shows that (1) non-discretionary factors do not appear
to provide a satisfactory explanation of why drug sentences have declined;
(2) at virtually every point in the Guidelines sentencing process where
prosecutors and judges can exercise discretionary authority to reduce drug
sentences, they have done so; and (3) where we can measure trends, the
trend since roughly 1992 has always been toward exercising discretion in
favor of leniency with increasing frequency. As lawyers, we found these
conclusions sound, if not unassailable.
The new data for 2000 discussed above is interesting on two broad
grounds. On the one hand, the overall downward motion of the average
federal drug sentence continued for another year. On the other hand, the
2000 statistics reveal a slowing, and in some instances a reversal, in the steady
yearly increases in discretionary leniency that began in 1991-1992. Whether
2000 will prove to be the bottom of a statistical valley or only a bump on the
path leading further down the canyon remains to be seen.
III. AN EXAMINATION OF DECLINING FEDERAL DRUG SENTENCES AT THE
DISTRICT AND CIRCUIT LEVEL

We felt that the conclusions we reached by examining national trend
lines would be enriched, and perhaps challenged, if we took a second look
at drug sentencing, this time focusing on trends at the district and circuit
level from 1992 through 1999. 243 We had three general objectives. First, we

hoped to test our original conclusions. Second, we hoped to refine some of
243. Because of publication deadlines for this Article, the regression analyses presented
below contain data from 1992-1999, but not data from FY 2000, which only became fully available in the early fall of 2001.
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our original conclusions. Third, we expected that examination of local and
regional data might expose some considerations we had not thought of
before. We think that each of these objectives has been fulfilled, at least in
part.
A.

ANY "REBELLrON" IS REGIONAL

Almost all of the national trend lines discussed in Rebellion I are
remarkably smooth, from the consistent yearly decline in the average federal
drug sentence itself, to the complementary upward and downward arcs of
mitigating and aggravating role adjustments, to the ever-rising proportion of
non-substantial assistance departures. An unblinking focus on these national
trend lines could lead one to the conclusion that the federal drug
sentencing scene from Maine to Southern California has been one
homogenous whole, in which the entire country has moved in rough unison
toward ever lower sentences. The reality is far otherwise.
It turns out that from 1992-1999, of the ninety-four federal districts, the
average drug sentence declined in fifty-one districts, but increased in forti-one
districts.244 Despite the near equipoise in the number of districts in which
sentences rose or fell, the national average drug sentence declined as
markedly as it did because, while sentences went down in only 54% of all
districts, the districts in which sentences declined handled a far larger
percentage of federally prosecuted drug cases-72% in 1999.245
Not only did drug sentences actually increase in many districts, but
between 1992 and 1999 the degree of variation among districts in average
drug sentences and of change in average drug sentences within districts was
remarkable. For example, in 1992, the average drug sentence varied from a
low of 40 months in the Western District of Kentucky to a high of 174
246
months in the Southern District of Georgia. In 1999, the lowest average
drug sentence was 22.4 months in the Southern District of California, and
the highest average drug sentence was 176 months in the Eastern District of
244. Compare 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at app. B, with 1999 SOURcEBOOK, supra
note 5, at app. B. The average sentence length in 1992 of two districts, Guam and the Northern
Marianas, is not reported in Sentencing Commission sources. Therefore, no measurement of
change in average sentence length from 1992-1999 was possible. Our observation that drug sentences seem to vary substantially from district is consistent with a variety of studies showing substantial inter-district violation in sentence length departure rates, and other factors affecting
sentence length. SeeJeffery T. Ulmer, John H. Kramer & Brian Johnson, District Matters: An
Analysis of Inter-District Variation in Federal Sentencing paper presented at annual meeting of
American Society of Criminology, Nov. 9, 2001 (Draft Summary on file with authors) (finding
that district in which defendant was sentenced during FY 1996-98 affected sentence length to a
statistically significant degree). PaulJ. Hofer, Kevin R. Blackwell & R. Barry Ruback, The Effect of
the FederalSentencing Guidelines on Inter-fudge Sentencing Disparity,90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
239, 240 (1999) (concluding that adoption of Guidelines reduced intra-district sentencing disparity, but may have increased inter-district disparity, particularly in drug cases).
245. 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supranote 5, at app. B.
246. 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 5,at app. B.
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North Carolina. 247 Between 1992 and 1999, the average drug sentence in the
Middle District of Georgia dropped by 70 months, falling from 160.7248
months to 87.5 months. 249 In the same period, the average drug sentence in
the Eastern District of North Carolina increased by 74.4 months, jumping
2 51
2 °
from 101.8 months 5 to 176.2 months.
Of course, the foregoing examples are merely the endpoints of the
spectrum of sentence severity and sentence variation, and it is unsurprising
that in a system of ninety-four districts some districts will differ considerably
from the national mean. Nonetheless, we were quite surprised by the degree
of variation. Moreover, the disparities both in average drug sentence length
and in change in average drug sentence length over time are almost as
pronounced at the circuit level as they are among districts. As Figures 9A
and 9B illustrate (we could not fit all twelve circuits on a single graph),
between 1992 and 1999, eight circuits experienced decreases in average
drug sentence, while the average drug sentence in four circuits increased.
FIGURE 9A: AVERAGE DRUG SENTENCE BY CIRCUITS:

FIRST THROUGH SIxTH, 1992-1999252
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247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

CA4 ----

1996

1997

1998

1999

CA2 ----CA3
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CA6

1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at app. B.
1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 5, at app. B.
1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at app. B.
1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 5, at app. B.
1999 SOURCEBOOK, supranote 5, at app. B.
The data underlying Figure 9A are drawn from the following sources:
REPORT, supra note 5, at app. B; 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 73, at app. B;
REPORT, supra note 80, at app. B; 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 32, at
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 58, at app. B; 1997 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 62, at
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 64, at app. B; 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at
SOURCEBOOK, supranote 6, at app. B.

1992
1994
app.
app.
app.
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FIGURE 9B: AVERAGE DRUG SENTENCE BY CIRCUITS: SEVENTH THROUGH
ELEVENTH & D.C., 1992-1999253
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At the circuit level, just as in the districts, the degree of variation in both
average drug sentences and of change in average drug sentences is striking.
In 1992, average circuit-wide drug sentences varied from a low of 70.9
months in the Second Circuit to a high of 133.3 months in the Eleventh
Circuit. By 1999, average circuit-wide drug sentences ranged from a low of
65.8 months in the Second Circuit to a high of 123.3 months in the Fourth
Circuit. Between 1992 and 1999, the average drug sentence increased by
thirty-one months (from 91.8 months to 123.3 months) in the Fourth
Circuit, but decreased by twenty-three months (from 133.3 months to 110
months) in the Eleventh Circuit.254 The variations between circuits are not
quite as dramatic as those between districts, but by any standard they are
quite pronounced.
The marked differences in average drug sentence at both the district
and circuit level have several important implications for anyone seeking to
explain the national decline in average drug sentence length. At the most
general level, the wide regional variations supply an immediate dose of
humility to anyone seeking to explain the national trend, and they inspire
caution about ascribing any particular motivation to the entire class of
sentencing system actors.
More particularly, the wide regional variations provide to the researcher
both a challenge and an opportunity. The challenge is to explain, to the
253. Id.
254. The Tenth Circuit experienced a similar twenty-three month decline between 1993
and 1999, from 110.8 months to 87.2 months. This steady six-year decline was preceded by a
one-yearjump upward from 91 months in 1992 to 110.8 months in 1993. Id.
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extent possible, the reasons for the local and regional variations. The
opportunity arises from the fact that each of the ninety-four judicial districts
is a separate sentencing system with essentially identical structural
components (i.e., U.S. Attorneys prosecuting drug cases under federal
statutes in front of life-tenured district judges who sentence convicted
defendants by applying the Federal Sentencing Guidelines with the
assistance of federal probation officers). Hence, each district can serve as a
unit of analysis in examining national trends. That is, one can identify
factors that might affect average drug sentence length (such as changes in
caseload or mix of drug type over time) and create regression equations
using judicial districts as the unit of analysis to determine whether such
factors affected average drug sentences to a statistically significant degree.
This approach, described in detail in the next section, is a primary source of
new insights in this Article.
B.

DISTRICT LEVEL REGRESSIONANALYSES

In Rebellion I, we concluded that both discretionary and nondiscretionary factors contributed to the decline in average federal drug
sentence length between 1992 and 1999, but that discretionary factors
appeared to predominate. 255 We suggested in a footnote that events in the
busy Mexican border districts might have had a disproportionate impact on
256
national sentencing averages. We also considered briefly the question of
why system actors were increasingly exercising discretion in the direction of
leniency for drug offenders, suggesting that some part of their motivation
might be a perception that drug sentences are higher than necessary.25 7 The
analyses of district-level sentencing data presented below cast light on each
of these three subjects.
1. Data, Variables, and Methodology
a. Data
The primary source of data employed in this analysis is United States
Sentencing Commission statistics. Most of the Sentencing Commission data
employed here are from Sentencing Commission publications; 258 however,
some unpublished data, particularly the figures on drug type by district for
the years 1992-1994, were provided to us by Commission staff.259 Data on the
255. Bowman & Heise, supra note 1, at 1126.
256. Id. at 1128 n.351.
257. Id. at 1131-34.
258. For the years 1992-1995, we drew principally from the U.S. Sentencing Commission's
Annual Repor and for the years 1996-1999, we drew principally from the U.S. Sentencing
Commission's yearly Sourcebook of FederalSentencing Statistics.
259. The USSC graciously supplied us unpublished district drug type data, 1992-1994,
through private correspondence. E-mail from Barbara Sharp, USSC, to Michael Heise (June 20,
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number of active district judges in each district annually were derived from
publications of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.2 °
Other data, such as the number of Assistant U.S. Attorneys in each district
annually, came from other published sources.261
Our reliance on published government data imposed certain
constraints on this research. The first of these stems from the fact that the
smallest practicable unit of analysis using published data is the federal
judicial district. For a good many of the factors potentially affecting average
drug sentence length, there exist published national statistics, but no
published district-by-district statistics. Thus, we were limited to studying
those factors as to which district-level data has been published.262 Happily,
published data do exist on several key issues about which we were most in
doubt at the conclusion of Rebellion I, including the effect on average
sentence length of events in the busy Mexican border districts, as well as
changes in drug type mix and judicial and prosecutorial workload.
Nonetheless, while using districts as the unit of analysis is useful because
each district is a separate system operating under essentially identical rules,
the approach carries some methodological limitations. Notably, because our
analysis treats each federal district as an equal entity, it treats developments
in the District of South Dakota, with an annual drug caseload of roughly
eighty, as equivalent to developments in the Southern District of California,
which now handles nearly two thousand drug cases per year.265 We have had
to be sensitive to any distortions that this approach might introduce.
Despite the limitations, we believe examination of data structured at the
federal district court level represents an important refinement of the
methods employed in Rebellion L By observing each of the ninety-four federal
judicial districts we can examine the data with more rigor and gain a more
2001) (on file with authors). District drug type data 1995-1999 was obtained from the Commission website, http://www.ussc.gov (last visited Nov. 29, 2001).
260.

ADMINISTRATIVE

OFFICE

OF

THE

UNITED

STATES

COURTS,

FEDERAL

COURT

MANAGEMENT STATISTICS (1997-2000), availableat http://vw.uscourts.gov/fcmstat/ (last visited
Nov. 29, 2001) (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
261. E-mail from Dr. Linda Roberge, Assistant Research Professor, Transactional Records
Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), Syracuse University, to Michael Heise (July 20, 2001) (on file
with the authors).
262. Ideally, one would employ data structured at the individual case-level. Although such
data exists, the size of the data set one would have to assemble (some 150,000 individual cases
from 1992-2000) and the form of the databases in which it is maintained rendered the use of
individual case statistics impractical for us. See Cindy R. Alexander, et al., Regulating Corporate
Criminal Sanctions:Federal Guidelines and the Sentencing of PublicFinns, 42 J. L. & ECON. 393, 40103, 419-20 (1999) (commenting unfavorably on the usability of Commission databases). We
recognize the inherent limitations of our approach, and look forward to having our conclusions
in both Rebellion I and this Article tested or refined by future researchers willing to tackle the
problem at the individual case level.
263. 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supranote 6, at app. B.
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nuanced picture of the national trend toward average drug sentence
reduction.
b.

Variables

Our dependant variable is the change in average drug sentence in each
district between 1992 and 1999. 264 Our independent variables fall into one of

three groups: drug type, workload, and district.
i.

Drug Type

In Rebellion I, we used national data to examine the hypothesis that the
downward trend in average drug sentence from 1992 to 1999 may simply
reflect changes in the mix of types of drug cases prosecuted. We concluded
that changes in mix of drug type do not seem to have caused the 1992-1999
decline. 26 5 To analyze this possibility further at the district level, we
generated one variable for each of the five major drug types that captures
the change in the drugs' relative share (as a percentage) of the overall drug
mix in each district during the time interval under analysis. For example, for
each drug type, COKE, CRACK, HEROIN, MARIJ., and METH., we
computed that drug type's percentage share of the drug cases sentenced in
each district in 1992, and again in 1999. For each district, we then subtracted
each drug's 1992 percentage from its 1999 percentage. A positive number
indicates that a drug's relative share increased between 1992 to 1999. A
negative number indicates that the drug's relative share declined over those
266
eight years.
264. The Sentencing Commission did not release 2000 federal sentencing data until the fall
of 2001. Due to publication and editing deadlines, we were unable to obtain and analyze district-level data for 2000 in time to include it in this Article.
265. Bowman & Heise, supranote 1, at 1087-90.
266. We also performed an identical set of regressions in which we used as independent
variables the change in raw numbers of each drug type within each district, rather than the
change in percentage. On reflection, we concluded that, except in very small U.S. Attorney's
Offices where a few marijuana or crack cases more or less can effect a large change in district
percentage figures for those drugs, changes in the relative proportions of the five major drug
types in a district's caseload are likely to have a greater impact on the average drug sentence in
that district than variations in raw numbers of cases. Accordingly, in the text we have focused on
the results of the percentage regressions, mentioning the raw number analyses in footnotes
where they appear relevant. In any event, the results of the raw number regressions were consistent with those using percentages in the sense that factors found to be significant using raw
numbers of drug cases virtually always also register as significant in the runs using percentages.
However, factors found statistically significant using percentages often did not register as significant in the runs using raw numbers of drug cases.
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In Rebellion I, we categorized the change in drug type mix over time as a
non-discretionary factor. We continue to do so here, but some additional
explanation of our taxonomy may be in order. A great deal of the variation
in average sentence level among districts, and to a lesser degree even among
circuits, is doubtless attributable to factors we have labeled "nondiscretionary," particularly differences in drug type and quantity. For
example, the fact that District A consistently has a much lower average drug
sentence than District B may be ascribable to the fact that District A
prosecutes a lot of low-quantity marijuana cases while District B prosecutes a
267
This apparently
lot of high-quantity methamphetamine cases.
unremarkable assertion conceals an important point about the structure and
alms of the research in both Rebellion land this Article.
Consider the districts with the lowest and highest average drug
sentences in the nation in 1999: the Southern District of California, with an
average sentence of 22.4 months, and the Eastern District of North Carolina,
with an average sentence of 176.2 months. In 1999, 63% of the 185 drug
defendants sentenced in the Eastern District of North Carolina were
sentenced for crack, which carries the highest average sentence of the five
major drug types. In 1999, the Southern District of California sentenced
1932 drug defendants-1632 defendants (84%) for marijuana, the drug type
with lowest average sentence, and exactly zero defendantsfor crack. In all of the
United States of America and its possessions in the year 1999, only four
other judicial districts had zero crack cases-Idaho, North Dakota, the
Northern Mariana Islands, and Guam. It is clear beyond the possibility of
rational dispute that in 1999 in San Diego and environs people were selling
and smoking crack, and that policemen were catching them,2 6 and thus that
the U.S. Attorney's Office in San Diego made a quite deliberate decision to
prosecute lots of marijuana cases, but not to prosecute crack cases at all. It is
only slightly less obvious, but equally true, that the U.S. Attorney in the
Eastern District of North Carolina could have prosecuted lots of marijuana
cases and few or no crack cases, but chose not to.
267. One of the questions our regression analyses examine is whether change in drug type
was a statistically significant factor affecting average sentence length within districts. Infranotes
288-302 and accompanying text.
268. For example, a study of state search warrants executed in drug cases in San Diego
County in the first six months of 1998 revealed that crack cocaine was the third most commonly
seized drug (after methamphetamine and marijuana) in searches conducted pursuant to warrants. Laurence A. Benner & Charles T. Samnarkos, SearchingforNarcotics in San Diego:Preliminary
Findingsfrom the San Diego Search WarrantProjec 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 221,250-51 (2000).
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The choices of U.S. Attorneys to emphasize one type of drug
prosecution over another are in some measure dictated by local drug
trafficking and use patterns, but are also in large measure discretionary with
the U.S. Attorney. Nonetheless, in neither Rebellion Inor this Article have we
included this component of prosecutorial discretion in our category of
"discretionary" factors. In Rebellion I, we looked at national data that
provided no insight into local priorities on drug types. In this Article,
although we examine district data, it is impossible to determine how much
of the drug type mix in any district is attributable to local trafficking patterns
and how much to prosecutorial priorities. 269 Finally, the objective of both
articles is to determine the cause of the decline in average drug sentence
nationally between 1992-1999, and more particularly to ascertain whether
that decline was caused by systemic changes beyond the control of individual
sentencing actors or by progressive changes in discretionary choices by those
individual actors about how similarly situated defendants should be
sentenced. Thus, we are somewhat less interested in why districts prosecute
particular mixes of drug types than in whether those mixes changed from
1992-1999. The regression analyses reported below can tell us whether
changes in drug type mix over time correlate with changes in the length of
the average drug sentence, but will not tell us whether such changes were
the product of changed local conditions or conscious local policy changes.
Therefore, in this Article we leave drug type mix in the "non-discretionary"
category.
ii.

Workload

The workloads confronted by judges and prosecutors might plausibly
influence average drug sentence length. Specifically, we hypothesized that
an increase in the workloads of a district's Assistant U.S. Attorneys (AUSAs)
and district judges might correspond with a decrease in average drug
sentences. AUSAs might be inclined to settle drug cases on terms more
favorable to defendants in response to an increased workload. Similarly,
judges might be inclined to approve plea agreements more favorable to
defendants as a mechanism to manage a growing docket.
To account for this possibility we examine workload in two different
manners for AUSAs and judges. Specifically, we consider workload from the
perspective of drug caseloads and overall criminal caseloads. AUSA CRIM.
and AUSA DRUG capture changes in AUSA workloads in the years from
1992 to 1999 for all criminal and drug cases. To compute AUSA CRIM., we
divided a district's total number of all criminal cases in each year by the
269. The Southern District of California in 1999 is the rare case in which the complete absence of one drug type is obviously the result of a local policy choice. Even in Southern California, however, it is impossible to determine what the "natural" proportion of crack cases might
be in the absence of the apparent prosecutorial moratorium on such prosecutions in federal
court.
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district's allocation of AUSAs in the same year. We computed AUSA DRUG
by dividing a district's total number of all drug cases in each year by the
district's allocation of AUSAs in the same year. The JUD. CRIM. and JUD.
DRUG variables were computed in a similar way. For these two variables we
divided each district's total number of all criminal cases and total number of
drug cases in each year by that year's figures for "judge months." Judge
months for each judicial district was computed by multiplying the number of
authorized judgeships in that district by twelve, and then subtracting the
total number of months in which one or more of the authorized judgeships
in the district stood unfilled (a figure published annually by the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts) 0
iii. District
Districts vary, not only in terms of their size and location, but also with
respect to the federal presence within each district. These variations might
influence drug sentence lengths. To control for each district's size (or
urbanicity) we include in our analyses POP. DENSITY that measures each
district's population density for 1995Y. A district's geographic location is
also important. In Rebellion I, we noted the need to examine with more care
districts located at or near the Mexican border. 27 At least three factors
might distinguish border districts from their non-border counterparts. First,
we note a sharp rise in the absolute and relative number of marijuana
prosecutions around 1996. Second, this sharp rise in marijuana prosecutions
coincides with these districts' adoption of "fast-track" case management
policies. That is, each of these districts has adopted special plea bargaining
policies that grant extraordinary sentencing concessions to defendants who
agree to plead guilty very early in the criminal process. We will discuss the
specifics of those policies below. 3 Third, unlike non-border districts, drug
cases prosecuted in a border district often possess immigration and
international law dimensions. Consequently, how federal districts on
international borders-especially the Mexican border-handle drug cases
might systematically differ from how non-border districts treat similar drug
cases. To identify such districts, BORDER is a dummy variable coded "1" for
those districts located at or near the Mexican border and "0" for all other
districts.
270.

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2000 CASE MANAGEMENT STATISTICs

(2001).
271. Unlike in other variables, data limitations forced us to apply a district's 1995 population count constant throughout the eight years of our study's scope. We are reasonably comfortable that actual population counts did not dramatically change in a manner that would distort our analyses.
272. Bowman &Heise, supra note 1, at 1128 n.351.
273. Infra notes 296-300 and accompanying text.
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Finally, federal presence in each district also varies. We construe federal
presence in terms of the numbers of federal district judges and AUSAs
assigned. Variations in the numbers of available federal prosecutors and
judges influence how districts manage their judicial systems. How a judicial
system is managed bears on drug sentence lengths. We define judicial
presence in terms of the number of 'Judge months" available to each district
each year ("JUD. MONTHS"). This variable was computed by multiplying
the number of authorized judgeships in a district by twelve, and then
subtracting the total number of months in which one or more of the
authorized judgeships in the district stood unfilled. We also look to the
number of available line prosecutors as a factor contributing to a district's
federal presence. For this variable we consider each district's allocation of
AUSAs ("AUSA").
iv. Summary Statistics
Table 10 provides a short description of the variables included in our
standard analyses, and Table 11 provides a statistical summary of these
variables including means and standard deviations.
TABLE 10: DESCRIPTION OF STANDARD VARIABLES
Variable

Description

Dtp
SENTCHG

Change in average sentence length, 1992-1999 (months)

IndDrug Type
COKE
CRACK
HEROIN
MARIJ.
METH.

Change in
Change in
Change in
Change in
Change in

cocaine's % of drug total, 1992-1999
crack's % of drug total, 1992-1999
heroin's % of drug total, 1992-1999
marijuana's % of drug total, 1992-1999
methamphetamine's % of drug total, 1992-1999

Workload:
JUD. DRUG
JUD. CRIM.
AUSA DRUG
AUSA CRIM.
District:
BORDER
POP. DENSITY
JUD. MONTHS
AUSA

Change in judicial drug caseload, 1992-1999
Change in judicial criminal caseload, 1992-1999
Change in AUSA drug caseload, 1992-1999
Change in AUSA criminal caseload, 1992-1999
District located at or near Mexican border (l=yes)
District's population density (1995)
Change in District's total number of "judge months," 19921999
Change in District's total number of AUSAs, 1992-1999
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TABLE 11: SUMMARY OF VARIABLES
Variable

Mean

S.D.

-1.16

28.01

-.24
.15
1.52 (e-02)
-6.22 (e-02)
.13

.16
.16
5.94 (e-02)
.15
.16

7.01 (e-02)
-.10
.57
1.23

5.27
16.50
2.37
4.65

5.32 (e-02)
352.27
7.34
6.33

.23
1105.61
13.32
8.26

De.
SENTCHG
Ind.
DrugType
COKE
CRACK
HEROIN
MARIJ.
METH.
Workload
JUD. DRUG
JUD. CRIM.
AUSA DRUG
AUSA CRIM.
District
BORDER
POP. DENSITY
JUD. MONTHS
AUSA

c. Methodology: ModelingAverage DrugSentences WithinJudicialDistricts
Guided by results from the previous descriptive analyses presented
above in Part II and elsewhere,274 in this Part we turn to a model for
analyzing potential causes of changes in average drug sentences in the
ninety-four federal judicial districts. We discuss results from multivariate
regression analyses275 that explore the model's efficacy. Our continuous
dependant variable-the average annual drug sentence (in months) in each
district-is modeled as a function of the three groups of variables described
in detail above: (1) drug type, (2) workload, and (3) district. Due to
multicollinearity concerns, 76 we present results from four separate but
related models.
274. See generally Bowman & Heise, supranote 1.
275. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) multiple regression was used to generate the coefficients for the model. Basic regression assumptions, including multicollinearity, were examined
and appear to have been satisfied. For a general discussion of OLS regression, see MICHAEL S.
LEWIs-BECK, APPLIED REGRESSION: AN INTRODUCTION (1980).
276. Although no firm "rule" on mullticollinearity exists within the literature, we adopted a
conservative approach, especially where variables were theoretically or practically similar. See,
e.g., GEORGE W. BOHRNSTEDT & DAVID KNOKE, STATISTICS FOR SOCIAL DATA ANALYSIS 407 (2d
ed. 1988) (suggesting the exclusion of variables where coefficients exceed 50%); MICHAEL 0.
FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAwYERS 352 (1990) ("A simple (but not foolproof) test for multicollinearity involves looking for high correlations (e.g., in excess of .9) in
pairs of explanatory variables .... "); MICHAEL S. LEwIs-BECK, APPLIED REGRESSION: AN
INTRODUCTION 60 (1980) (suggesting a .80 threshold).
277. Not surprisingly, the number of federal judges authorized for a district correlate with
the number of authorized AUSAs. Also expected is that the total criminal and drug case workloads for judges and AUSAs correlates. Consequently, we could not include these combinations
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We wanted to know not only whether any of the independent variables
had a statistically significant effect on the movement of average drug
sentences within districts over the entire 1992-1999 study period, but also
whether any of these variables exhibited effects during shorter intervals
within the study period. Accordingly, we applied our model not only to the
period 1992-1999, but also to subintervals running forward from 1992 and
backward from 1999. That is, we applied the model to the periods 19921993, 1992-1994, 1992-1995, and so on, as well as to the periods 1998-1999,
1997-1999, 1996-1999, and so on.
2.

Regression Results and Discussion

Table 12 presents results from our model of change in average drug
sentence length from 1992 to 1999. Four interesting points emerge from
these results. First, our district level analysis supports the conclusion in
Rebellion I that, if one looks only at the beginning and ending points of the
1992-1999 period, changes in drug type mix do not emerge as a causal factor
in the decline of average drug sentence length. Second, neither judicial
caseload nor urbanicity (expressed as population density) appears
significant. Third, increases in both AUSA drug caseload and criminal
caseload correlate at the p<.01 level to decreases in average drug sentence
length in a judicial district. Finally, and somewhat oddly, increases in the
number of AUSAs in a district also correlate (albeit only at the p<.05 level)
with a decline in drug sentence length.
in a single regression equation. Instead, we ran the basic model four times and toggled between
judges and AUSAs and criminal and drug case workloads.
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TABLE

12:

IMPAGT ON CHANGE IN AVERAGE DRUG SENTENCE LENGTH,

1992-

1999
Drug Type:
COKE
CRACK
HEROIN
MARIJ.
METH.
(ref.)m
Workload:
JUD. DRUG
JUD. CRIM.
AUSA DRUG
AUSA CRIM.
District:
BORDER
POP. DENSITY
JUD. MONTHS
AUSA
(constant)
R (adj.)
Std. Error
F-Stat
N2m
*p <.05; ** p <.01'

(A)

(B)

(C)

(D)

8.80
29.33
-24.38
-20.58
-

9.12
30.28
-23.82
-20.36
-

-17.9
18.70
-32.22
-31.31
-

-18.59
14.92
-28.38
-29.56

.47
-

.21
-

-

-3.49 **
-

-

-18.91
-1.58 (e-03)
-.26
.97
.04
27.48
1.45
92

-20.24
-1.60 (e-03)
-.24
1.03
.05
27.31
1.54
92

-12.2
-3.50 (e-03)
-1.11*
2.24
.14
25.9
2.86 **
90

-

-1.76**
-22.23
-3.78(e-03)
-1.08*
2.41
.12
26.33
2.45 *
90

278.
For each district in every year, the summation of the five drug type percentages equals
100%. As a result, we were forced to select one drug type to serve as the reference group and
omit it from our regression equations. Although the particular drug type selected is arbitrary
and no particular selection would be "wrong" (see MELISSA A. HARDY, REGRESSION WITH DUMMY
VARIABLES 10 (1993)), we nonetheless took the additional step of re-running our basic regression equation with alternative drug types serving as the reference. Our selection of the reference drug type did not appear to influence or destabilize our results. See generally MICHAEL S.
LEWIS-BECK, APPLIED REGRESSION: AN INTRODUCTION 68 (1980).
Although ninety-four federal districts exist in the United States federaljudicial system,
279.
by default the listwise deletion function in the regression analyses excludes any district that contains any missing data from any variable included in the equation. See MarijaJ. Norusis, SPSS
10.0: Guide to Data Analysis 460 (2000). Consequently, our N values across the four columns
vary slightly.
280. Within the context of Tables 12, 13A, and 13B, and our related discussion, we use the
term statistical significance as it is conventionally used in the social science literature. More specifically, we adopt the p<.05 threshold for statistical significance. Used in this manner, statistical
significance means that the probability that the observed relation occurred due to random
chance is less one-in-twenty (or 5 percent). SeeJohn Lande, FailingFaithin Litigation?A Survey of
Business Lawyers' and Executives' Opinions, 3 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REv. 1, 11-12 n.37
(1998) (citingJOHN NETER ET AL, APPLIED STATISTICS 310-38 (3rd ed. 1988)).
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Regression runs on the forward-looking and backward-looking
subintervals28' also produced interesting results. The first of these was that
AUSA caseload consistently emerged as significant. AUSA drug caseload,
criminal caseload, or both achieved statistical significance in seven of the
twelve subinterval regression runs. 282 In each case, increased AUSA caseload
correlated with decreased average drug sentence. Second, the finding that
judicial caseload was not significant over the entire 1992-1999 period is
corroborated by the sub-interval regressions. Judicial caseload appears
statistically significant in only two of the twelve subintervals. 283 Third,
although for the period 1992-1999 an increase in the number of AUSAs in a
district correlates with a decrease in average drug sentence (at the p<.05
level), that somewhat counterintuitive correlation appears in only two of
twelve subinterval regressions. 284 Finally, although change in the proportion
of drug types within districts does not emerge as a statistically significant
factor in declining drug sentences within districts from 1992-1999, an
increase in the proportion of marijuana cases in a district correlates at the
p<.05 level to a decline in average drug sentence in four of the twelve
subintervals: 1992-1993, 1992-1995, 1992-1998, and 1996-1999. As explained
in detail below, we consider these subinterval findings highly suggestive. For
reasons of space, we do not include tables containing the results of all twelve
subinterval regressions. Tables 13A and 13B present the results of the
regression analyses of subintervals 1996-1999 and 1992-1995.
281. By "forward-looking interval," we mean intervals beginning with 1992, such as 19921993 and 1992-1994. By "backward-looking intervals," we mean intervals ending in 1999, such as
1998-1999 and 1997-1999.
282. Both increased drug caseload and criminal caseload correlated to decreased average
drug sentence length at the p<.01 level in 1992-1994, 1992-1995, 1992-1998, and 1993-1999. In
1992-1996, drug caseload correlated at the p<.01 level, while criminal caseload correlated at the
p<.05 level. In 1994-1999, drug caseload only achieved statistical significance at the p<.01 level.
In 1992-1997, drug caseload only achieved statistical significance at the p<.05 level.
283. Judicial drug caseload and criminal caseload correlated to decreased average drug
sentence length in 1992-1993 at the p<.01 level. In 1994-1999,judicial drug caseload only correlated at the p<.05 level.
284. An increase in the number of AUSAs in a district correlated to decreased average drug
sentence length in 1992-1998 at the p<.05 level, and in 1994-1999 at p<.05 in one run and p<.01
in another.
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TABLE 13A: IMPACT ON CHANGE IN AVERAGE SENTENCE LENGTH, 1996-1999
(A)

(B)

(C)

(D)

-3.11
29.43
19.26

-1.8
29.83
20.51

-12.71
36.16 *
7.42

-9.07
37.38 *
10.26

-47.5 *

-46.47 *

-48.01 *

-39.93 *

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-3.99 (e-02)
-

-

-

AUSA DRUG

-.53
-

-1.74

-

AUSA CRIM.

-

-

-

-1.17

-10.14
-8.01 (e-04)

-12.73
-7.92 (e-04)

-5.17
-5.03 (e-04)

-2.03
-7.29(e-04)

-8.53 (e-02)

-8.72 (e-02)

-

-

DrugType
COKE
CRACK
HEROIN
MARIJ.
METH. (ref.)

Workload
JUD. DRUG
JUD. CRIM.

District
BORDER
POP.
DENSITY
JUD.

MONTHS
-

-

-. 13

-9.35 (e-02)

(constant)
R2 (adj.)
Std. Error

-.46
.12
17.64

-.55
.12
17.66

.96
.19
16.11

F-Stat

2.57 *

2.55 *

3.62 **

Nm

94

94

90

1.57
.19
16.13
3.57 **
90

AUSA

*p <.05; ** p <.01
285. Although ninety-four federal districts exist in the United States federal judicial system,
by default the listwise deletion function in the regression analyses excludes any district that
contains any missing data from any variable included in the equation. See Marija J. Norusis,
SPSS 10.0: Guide to Data Analysis 460 (2000). Consequently, our N values across the four
columns vary slightly.
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TABLE 13B: IMPACT ON CHANGE IN AVERAGE SENTENCE LENGTH, 1992-1995

(A)

(B)

(C)

(D)

COKE

-35.72

-34.78

-40.0

-34.23

CRACK

21.96

21.77

25.61

24.41

HEROIN

-28.80

-23.41

-20.16

9.89

MARIJ.

-48.57

-48.67

-51.99 *

-50.94 *

METH. (ref.)

-

-

-

-

JUD. DRUG

-.40

-

-

-

JUD. GRIM.

-

-8.50 (e-02)

-

-

AUSA DRUG

-

--

AUSA GRIM.

-

-

-

-3.71 **

BORDER

-5.47

-6.08

2.27

-10.08

POP. DENSITY

-1.43 (e-03)

-1.41 (e-03)

-1.99 (e-03)

-2.86(e-03)

JUD. MONTHS

-8.96 (e-02)

-8.38 (e-02)

-

-

AUSA

Drug Type.

Workload:

6.13**

-

District.

-

-

-.59

-.92

(constant)

7.0

6.83

10.51

9.57

R! (adj.)

.04

.04

.17

.21

Std. Error

26.48

26.51

24.56

24.05

F-Stat

1.48

1.45

3.31 **

3.88 **

N

92

92

90

90

*p <.05; ** p <.01

C.
Our regression analyses

DRUG TYPES

of district data, read in

conjunction

with

descriptive national data, have caused us to alter our view that the "nondiscretionary" factor of changed drug type mix had no relationship to the
decline in average drug sentence length from 1992-1999. 2 8 7 Taken together,

286.
Although ninety-four federal districts exist in the United States federal judicial system,
in two districts-Guam and Northern Marianas-data were unavailable. Due to these two districts' lack of complete data, the listwise deletion function excluded these districts from the
analysis.
287. Bowman & Heise, supra note 1, at 1087-90, 1103.
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our descriptive and statistical analyses point to three conclusions: (1)
Change in drug type mix did not in itself cause the decline in average drug
sentence from 1992-1999. (2) Indeed, all else being equal, the change in
national drug type mix from 1992-1996 actually would have increased
sentences in that period. (3) Change in national drug type mix probably
contributed to the decline in the national average drug sentence from 19961999, in part because of two developments along the Mexican border. First,
the number of drug sentencings in the already busy Mexican border districts
(the Southern District of California. Arizona, New Mexico, and the Western
and Southern Districts of Texas) nearly doubled, with the vast majority
being marijuana cases, which carry the lowest average sentence of any of the
five major drug types. Second, between 1995 and 1997, the Mexican border
districts adopted so-called "fast track" case processing schemes pursuant to
which defendants charged with relatively low-seriousness drug crimes at the
border-usually marijuana offenses-receive extra sentence discounts not
contemplated by the Guidelines for early pleas. Thus, the rise in percentage
of marijuana cases, which in itself tends to lower average drug sentence
length, was accompanied by a wholesale increase in other sentence-reducing
prosecutorial concessions. These conclusions flow from the following
observations:
For the period 1992-1999, variations in none of the drug types achieve
statistical significance in our regression analyses of district trends. However,
during this interval, coefficients for drug types generally comport with
expectations. Marijuana and heroin coefficients are negative, meaning that
average drug sentences tend to fall as the proportion of these drugs within
the total drug prosecutions in a district rises. This makes sense because
average sentences for marijuana and heroin convictions are shorter than for
the other drug types. 288 Conversely, the positive coefficient for the crack

variable reflects its position as the drug that receives the longest average
sentence. That the coefficient for cocaine is both positive and negative
reveals little more than its close proximity to methamphetamine in terms of
average sentence length.
Despite the lack of statistical significance of variations in drug type mix
over the entire 1992-1999 period, the regression series for time intervals
within the 1992-1999 study period reveal that the negative coefficient for
marijuana becomes statistically significant in four sub-intervals. Three of
these intervals-1996-1999, 1992-1995, and 1992-1998-seem particularly
significant when read in conjunction with national descriptive data. First, as
shown in Figure 10 below, if one plots the hypothetical trajectory of average
drug sentences that would have occurred if the average drug sentence for
each drug type had remained constant at 1992 levels while the mix of drug
288. More precisely, marijuana and heroin sentences are typically shorter than sentences
for our reference group-methamphetamine.

HeinOnline -- 87 Iowa L. Rev. 547 2001-2002

87 IOWA LAWREVIEW

[20021

types varied as it actually did, the graph shows a rise in average drug
sentences between 1992 and 1996. This rise is followed by a decline in 19961998, and virtually no change from 1998-2000.28 9 In other words, national
changes in drug type mix would have tended to push sentences up from
1992-1996 and down from 1996-1998. The 1992-1995 and 1996-1999
regression runs converge from different temporal directions on precisely the
point at which the proportion of marijuana in the national drug type mix
begins to rise sharply. The endpoint of the 1992-1998 interval coincides with
the year in which, under the assumptions of the foregoing hypothetical, the
rising marijuana percentage stops driving down the national average drug
sentence.

FIGURE 10: HYPOTHETICAL AVERAGE DRUG SENTENCE (1992-2000): HOLDING
SENTENCES WITHIN DRUG TYPE AT

1992

LEVELS

92
91
90
(mos.)

89
88
87
86
85
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

289. Holding average sentences constant at 1992 levels while varying the drug type mix as it
actually did vary, the national average drug sentence would have varied within a range of
1l/100ths of a month, from 88.87 months in 1998, to 88.93 months in 1999, to 88.82 months in
2000.
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Second, as shown in Figure 11 below, the national data on average base
offense level (which can be affected both by changes in drug quantity and
changes in drug type) show an increase in national average base offense
level from 1992-1999, with a peak in 1996, followed by a decrease between
1996-1999. In Rebellion Iand above, we note that the 1992-1999 BOL increase
might be the result of an increase in drug quantity per case or of a change in
drug type mix. 29 ° Given that BOLs within drug type increased from 1992-

1999 for every drug but marijuana, increased drug quantity in cocaine,
crack, heroin, and methamphetamine cases appears to have been at least
one cause for the general upward 1992-1999 movement of average BOL.
Similarly, the relative decrease in BOL from 1996 to 1999 might be the
result of a progressive decrease in drug quantity per defendant, but it is also
consistent with a rising proportion of cases involving a low-sentence drug
such as marijuana. In this case, the fact that between 1996 and 1999 the
average base offense level within drug type held steady or increased for every
drug except marijuana 1 renders the latter hypothesis more probable than
the former.
FIGURE 11: AVERAGE BASE OFFENSE LEVEL, BYYEAR

29

28
BOL
27

26

25
1992

1993

1
1994

1
1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

290. Bowman & Heise, supra note 1, at 1090-94; supranotes 114-26 and accompanying text.
291. Supra note 111 and accompanying text.
292. The data underlying Figure 11 are drawn from unpublished U.S. Sentencing Commission data, supranote 125.
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Third, our conclusion about the more probable explanation of the
downward dip in BOL from 1996-1999 requires that the percentage of
marijuana cases have increased in this period. As illustrated in Figure 3
above, the percentage of marijuana cases nationally dipped from 1994-1996,
but increased steadily from 1996-1999.293
Fourth, from 1996-1999, the number of drug cases sentenced in the five
Mexican border districts more than doubled from 3186 to 6605, with 80% of
the increase (2737 out of 3419 cases) being marijuana cases.294 These trends

are especially significant because, by 1999, drug prosecutions in these five
districts accounted for roughly 30% of all drug cases natonally. 295
Fifth, the steep rise in drug prosecutions generally, and in marijuana
prosecutions in particular, along the Mexican border occurred in
conjunction with an important innovation in prosecutorial policy in the
border districts. Beginning in 1995 in the Southern District of California,
U.S. Attorney's Offices along the Mexican border began adopting so-called
"fast track" case processing policies for relatively low-level narcotics
offenders, usually those carrying marijuana, caught crossing the Mexican
border. Although the specifics have differed over time and from district to
district, the essence of these programs is an offer of extraordinary sentence
reductions to defendants willing to plead guilty pre-indictment to an
information. At present, in the Southern District of California a defendant
willing to enter such a plea typically receives a three-level "super acceptance
297
of responsibility" reduction, 29' a two-level reduction for minor role, and a
two-level "fast track departure." 298 The "super acceptance" reduction would
always have been available to a defendant willing to enter an early plea;
however, an award of minor role to a drug courier or mule is by no means
assured, 299 and a departure for pleading guilty quickly is unknown except on
the border. °
293. Supra note 93 and accompanying text.
294.
1996 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 58, at app. B; 1998 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 64, at app.
B; 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supranote 5, at app. B.
295. Id.
296. U.S.S.G. §§ 3EL.1(a)-(b) (2000).
297. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b) (2000).
298. This description of the current "fast track" sentencing package in the Southern District of California was provided by Assistant U.S. Attorney John Kraemer, who coordinates the
fast track program in the Southern District of California. Telephone Interview with John
Kramer, Assistant U.S. Attorney (Aug. 2001). For a discussion of a similar "fast-track" plea bargaining policy adopted by the Southern District of California in criminal immigration cases, see
United States v. Estrada-Plata, 5- F.3d 757, 759 (9th Cir. 1995) (describing, and rejecting equal
protection challenge to immigration fast-track policy); Thomas Bak, PretrialDetention in the Ninth
Circuit, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 993, 1022 n.62 (1998); Alan D. Bersin &judith Feigin, The Rule of
Law at the Border: Reinventing Prosecution Policy in the Southern District of California, 12 GEO.
IMMIGRANT L.J. 285, 301 (1998) (describing immigration fast-track policy).
299. The courts have held that being a courier or mule does not necessarily entitle a defendant to a role reduction. See HAINEs, BOWMAN & WOLL, supranote 79, at 899-900 (discussing
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Sixth, the advent of border "fast track" programs may be visible in
national statistics other than those on average drug sentences. In addition to
the increase in the national proportion of marijuana cases beginning in
1996,301 national statistics on role adjustments are suggestive. As shown in
Figure 7 above, 302 the percentage of defendants awarded minor or minimal
role adjustments increased from 1992-1995, and then plateaued in 19951996. However, in 1996, the year border "fast track" programs began to
come into full effect, the percentage of mitigating role adjustments resumed
its climb at an even steeper rate than before.
Finally, although trends in the Mexican border districts from 1996-1999
doubtless exerted a disproportionate effect on national sentencing averages
because of the number of cases handled in them, the border does not in
itself explain either the impact of marijuana on national averages or the
continued decline of the national average drug sentence from 1996-1999.
To test the border effect, we ran additional regressions for the periods
1992-1999 and 1996-1999 using the same variables described in Table 11
above, but removing the border districts. For 1992-1999, the change in
percentage of marijuana cases within a district remained statistically
insignificant as a predictor of change in average drug sentence length.
However, for 1996-1999, when the border districts are excluded, marijuana
remains correlated to a decline in average drug sentence, albeit to a lesser
degree than when those districts are included.
These findings are important, but should not be over-interpreted. They
cause us to modify our conclusions in Rebellion I insofar as changes in drug
type mix, specifically large increases in marijuana prosecutions in the border
districts, seem to correlate with reduced average drug sentences from 19961999. However, our data does not permit any quantification of the effect of
changing drug type mix either before or after 1996. Moreover, to the extent
events in the border districts in 1996-1999 affected national drug sentence
averages, those effects resulted in part from changes in drug type mix
resulting from government choices to prosecute increased numbers of
marijuana offenders, and in part from border district policies under which
prosecutors offer and judges sanction extraordinary sentence discounts. We
will discuss the implications of these policies below in Section IV.
circuit splits on role adjustments for drug couriers and 2001 amendment to commentary of
U.S.S.G. §3B1.2).
300. For discussion of whether such a departure is appropriate under the Guidelines, see
Section IV below.
301. Supra note 110 and accompanying text.
302. Supra note 135.
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WORKLOAD

We hypothesized that average drug sentence would decrease as drug
and overall criminal case workloads increased. This hypothesis was
supported with respect to the drug and overall criminal caseloads of
Assistant U.S. Attorneys. As noted above, increased AUSA caseload correlates
to a decrease in district-wide average drug sentence in 1992-1999 and in
seven of the twelve subinterval regressions.3 ° The finding that increased
AUSA caseload correlates with decreased average drug sentence length may
be reinforced by the apparently anomalous observation that, in the period
1992-1999, increases in the number of AUSAs in a district correlate with a
decline in average drug sentence length. Assuming that the Department of
Justice reacted rationally to caseload increases, it would have augmented the
attorney resources of those districts experiencing the greatest additional
workload. To the extent increases in workload are associated with decreases
in average sentence, an increase in AUSA numbers might also correlate with
decreased sentence length.
Our most puzzling workload findings are that, in the 1992-1999
regression, neither judicial criminal nor drug caseloads emerged as
significant, and even more surprisingly, the workload coefficients were
positive, rather than the expected negative. That is, our results for 1992-1999
suggest that as judicial workload in a district increased, drug sentences
tended to go up (albeit not to a statistically significant degree). In the
subinterval regressions, judicial caseload variables presented as significant in
only two subintervals, and with negative coefficients. Judicial drug and
criminal caseload correlate to a decrease in average drug sentence at the
p<.01 level in 1992-1993, and judicial drug caseload only correlates with a
decrease in average drug sentence in 1994-1999 at the p<.05 level.
We are not entirely sure what to make of the fact that increased AUSA
caseload seemed to correlate to decreased drug sentences so consistently,
while judicial caseload seemed to make no real difference. This outcome
seems particularly odd in light of the fact that caseload increases would
generally have had a larger numerical impact on judges than on AUSAs
because there are far fewer judges than prosecutors in each district, and
because district court staffing stayed essentially static throughout the period.
No new judgeships were created and the only variation in number ofjudges
from year to year occurred due to the opening and filling of vacancies
among existing judgeships. By contrast, the staffing of U.S. Attorney's
Offices increased markedly throughout the 1990s, even if it did not match
the rise in number of cases. It may be that district court judges are simply
less sensitive to caseload pressure than prosecutors. Or it may be that
303.

Supra note 282 and accompanying text.
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prosecutors are better able to manipulate sentencing outcomes to relieve
caseload pressure than are judges.
E. DISTRICT
While none achieve statistical significance, the population and district
location (BORDER) variables perform as hypothesized. Our previous work
and analyses of descriptive data and trends suggested that activities in the
border districts warranted special care. Because of their physical location,
typical drug crimes in border districts-unlike their non-border district
counterparts-raise immigration and international law issues with greater
regularity. Also, as noted above, around 1996 both the absolute and relative
quantity of marijuana cases increased notably. The second point informs our
hypothesis of a possible effect of border districts on average sentence length.
Specifically, we surmised that average drug sentences in border districts
would fall below that of their non-border district counterparts. The negative
coefficients in all four runs comport with our expectation. However, when
the identical analyses performed for Table 11 are run excluding all border
districts the results do not materially change. 304 Thus, we do not want to
over-emphasize the role border districts play with respect to variations in
average drug sentence length during the eight-year scope of our data.
Another salient district characteristic relates to population density.
Through this variable we sought to capture "urbanicity." We surmised that in
urban settings, prevailing norms about drug use might distinguish those
districts' treatment of drug crimes. Alternatively, U.S. Attorney's Offices in
urban centers might not have the resources or the interest in prosecuting
particular drug cases (e.g., cases involving relatively small amounts of drug)
that might interest nonurban districts. In any event, we expected that an
increase in population density would correspond with a decrease in average
drug sentence length. Although population density did not achieve
statistical significance, the negative coefficients in all four runs comport with
our expectation.
We were concerned that the size of a U.S. Attorney's Office might
influence drug sentence length independently of either urbanicity or
caseload. Federal prosecutors in urban areas with high population density
might treat drug offenders differently than their more rural counterparts. At
the same time, a comparatively large U.S. Attorney's Office confronting a
high volume of drug cases might approach such cases differently than a
smaller, lower-volume office. Not surprisingly, the population density and
total AUSA variables co-vary. Consequently, multicollinearity concerns
compelled us to choose between them. For our standard runs we opted for
population density area as a more helpful variable. However, to insure that
our selection did not influence the results, we re-ran all the regressions and
304. Results for this unreported analysis are available from the authors upon request.
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substituted for population density a variable measuring the total number of
AUSAs in a district in the period under examination.
Overall, the
substitution did not alter the results in any meaningful manner.306
The coefficients for our dual measures for federal presence in a district
(JUD. MONTHS and AUSA) are negative rather than the expected positive
and none achieve significance. As a result, the data suggest that the presence
of large numbers of judges and prosecutors in a district corresponds with a
reduction in the average length of a federal drug sentence. One explanation
for these perhaps counterintuitive findings might be that our federal
presence variables are reflecting something other than what we initially
suspected. For example, an increased federal presence might reflect overall
district population or volume of drug cases. If so, the observed negative
coefficients would make more sense.
IV.

THE WHOLE STORY: COMBINING NATIONAL AND REGIONAL DATA

With the benefit of the foregoing regression analyses and another full
year of national sentencing data, we think we have a more complete picture
of the movement of federal drug sentences over the past fifteen years. As we
now see it, there have been four sometimes-overlapping story lines. First,
mandatory minimum sentencing statutes and the Sentencing Guidelines
sharply increased drug sentence length from roughly 1986 through 19911992.
Second, beginning around 1992, national policy-making organs made a
series of decisions that were either consciously directed at lowering drug
sentences or had that effect. In 1992, the Sentencing Commission amended
§ 3El.1 to permit a third offense level decrease for "super acceptance of
responsibility." In 1994, the Commission eliminated the top two levels of the
drug quantity table. In 1995, Congress passed the statutory safety valve,
which was followed in 1996 by the Sentencing Commission's adoption of a
guideline safety valve. In 1996, the Supreme Court decided Koon v. United
States, 307 with its tacit encouragement of increased non-substantial assistance
departures.
Third, beginning in about 1992, every available indicator suggests that
front-line actors in the sentencing system employed their discretion to an
ever-increasing degree to lower drug sentence length. The percentage of
mitigating role adjustments climbed steadily upward as the percentage of
aggravating role adjustments declined. Guilty plea rates climbed, and "super
acceptance of responsibility" rates climbed even faster. More and more
305. That is, we added the number of serving AUSAs in a district in each year of the period
studied. For example, if the period under scrutiny was 1992-1994, and a district had ten AUSAs
in 1992, twelve AUSAs in 1993, and fourteen AUSAs in 1994, the district would be deemed to
have an AUSA variable of thirty-six.
306. Results of alternative runs are available from the authors upon request.
307. 518 U.S. 81 (1996).

HeinOnline -- 87 Iowa L. Rev. 554 2001-2002

RFBELLIONII
sentences were imposed at the bottom of the applicable guideline range.
The tiny fraction of upward departures in drug cases fell still further, while
the percentage of non-substantial assistance departures rose two-and-a-half
times between 1992 and 1999. Beginning in 1992, the fraction of substantial
assistance departures grew from 24% to more than 30% of all drug cases
(though the percentage plateaued in the mid-1990s and even declined
slightly in the late 1990s). Charge and fact bargaining certainly occurred,
although we cannot say how often. The general trend toward discretionary
mitigation of drug sentences is, we think, unmistakable at the national level.
Nonetheless, large sections of the country did not participate: sentences in
many districts held basically steady throughout the nineties, and in some
districts moved sharply upward.
Finally, from 1996 to 1999, the statistical trend to ever-lower national
average drug sentences was abetted by prosecutorial "fast track" initiatives in
the five Mexican border districts, the purpose of which was not to mitigate
drug penalties, but to impose them on a broader swath of border-crossing
offenders. The influx into the 1996-1999 sentencing averages of thousands
of new relatively low-sentence marijuana offenders, whose sentences were
often reduced still further by extraordinary "fast track" sentencing
concessions, assuredly reduced the national average drug sentence length
even faster than it would otherwise have fallen.
As complex as this picture appears, ascertaining the motives of those
whose decisions produced ever-lower average drug sentences is more
complicated still. Nonetheless, our work suggests several conclusions, which
we advance with varying degrees of confidence. To begin, the original
increase in drug sentences following the implementation of the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, and the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines was a conscious objective of at least the socially
conservative members of the congressional coalition that crafted federal
sentencing reform. Likewise, the original Sentencing Commission drafted
sentencing guidelines for drug offenses knowing that the structure they
created would raise drug sentences over historical norms.
The second phase of the federal drug sentencing story is one in which
Congress, the Sentencing Commission, and the Supreme Court all made
decisions that were either expressly designed to ameliorate the severity of
the original Guidelines drug sentencing structure, or at the very least were
made fully anticipating that effect. The statutory and Guidelines safety valves
fall into the first category, while the "super acceptance of responsibility"
reduction and the Supreme Court's Koon decision fall into the second.
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The thinking of the thousands of judges, prosecutors, defense
attorneys, and probation officers whose discretionary case-by-case choices
have been whittling away at drug sentence lengths for almost ten years is
harder to pigeonhole. In Rebellion I, we suggested that one theme in the
thinking of these front-line actors has been the belief that drug sentences
are often, though not always, either too long as a matter of equity or longer
than necessary to achieve the personal or institutional objectives of the
decision-makers. The new analyses in this Article, at a minimum, pose
several challenges to this thesis.
First, the finding that drug sentences have held steady or even increased
dramatically in some judicial districts is not in itself surprising. Any large
system composed of numerous semi-autonomous units will have some
behavioral outliers. However, the number of districts in which sentences
increased, as well as the size of the increases in some of those districts, did
surprise us. If indeed there is a quiet rebellion against the severity of federal
drug sentences, or at least a falling away from uniform and disciplined
enforcement of drug sentencing rules, that movement has not swept into
every corner of the land. Rather, there is a substantial minority of districts
who continue addressing drug sentences more or less as they always have or,
as in the Fourth Circuit, have striven for even higher sentences. Thus, if
there has been a quiet rebellion against federal drug sentence severity, the
rebellion has been regional, and there remain large pockets of drug
enforcement loyalists.
Second, our finding that increased prosecutorial caseload within
judicial districts correlates consistently with decreased drug sentence length
is hardly surprising. Indeed, it squares perfectly with common wisdom about
plea bargaining. However, one might argue that the salience of
prosecutorial workload in our results renders less compelling the hypothesis
that drug sentences are falling because of judicial and prosecutorial
judgments that drug sentences are more severe than necessary. In other
words, maybe "it's the workload, stupid." To this suggestion there are several
responses. First, workload doubtless plays a role in prosecutorial sentencing
choices-the question is whether it is the whole story. We are inclined to
think not.
Average caseloads of Assistant U.S. Attorneys are just not very high,
particularly as compared to those of state prosecutors. For example, a 1987
study found that the mean annual number of felony dispositions for a state
prosecutor was 137.75,3° s roughly thirteen times greater than the average
caseload for AUSAs during the 1990s.3" 9 Moreover, national figures for
308.
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PROCEDURES (1987); see also, Bowman & Heise, supra note 1, at 1128 n.350 (describing Bow-

man's experience as a Deputy District Attorney in Denver, Colorado in the late 1980s, when his
annual felony caseload customarily exceeded 200 cases).
309. SeeTable 14, infra (showing average AUSA caseloads ranging from 9.163 to 11.678 dur-
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average AUSA caseload set out in Table 14, reveal two key points: (a) that
criminal and drug caseloads were only fractionally higher in 1999 than they
were in 1992, and (b) that criminal and drug caseloads actually fell from
1992 to 1995 before rising gradually to their current levels. The notion that
all across America AUSAs have felt constrained to make deals for ever-lower
drug sentences merely because, over an eight-year stretch, their average
annual caseload increased by one criminal case or 0.6 drug case per
prosecutor is implausible on its face. More importantly, if caseload were
determinative, one would expect to see sentences rise when caseloads fall,
yet the fluctuation in caseloads from 1992-1999 has no observable
correlation to the continuous downward movement of drug sentences in the
same period.
1992-1999310
TABLE 14: AVERAGE AUSA CRIMINAL AND DRUG CASELOADS,

1992

AUSA Crim. Caseload
10.446

AUSA Drug Caseload
4.129

1993

11.671

4.851

1994

10.803

4.211

1995

9.163

3.465

1996

10.035

3.933

1997

10.918

4.216

1998

10.979

4.391

1999

11.678

4.749

Likewise, if system overload were the problem for which declining
sentences have been the solution, one would expect to see an across-theing the period 1992-1999).
310. The figures in Table 14 were derived by dividing the number of criminal cases and
drug cases sentenced in each year, as reported in U.S. Sentencing Commission figures, by the
number of AUSAs working in each year. The data on number of cases were drawn from the following sources: 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 5, at app. B; 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote
73, at app. B; 1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 80, at app. B; 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
32, at app. B; 1996 SOURCEBOOK, supranote 58, at app. B; 1997 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 62, at
app. B; 1998 SOURCEBOOK, supranote 64, at app. B; 1999 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at app. B.
The data on AUSA numbers were provided by TRAC. E-mail from Dr. Linda Roberge, Assistant
Research Professor, Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), Syracuse University,
to Michael Heise (July 20, 2001) (on file with authors).
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board decrease in sentences for all federal crimes. As we noted in Rebellion I,
sentence length for immigration and fraud crimes, the second and third
most common federal offenses, rose from 1993-1999,
as did the length of
31
sentences for tax crimes, burglary, and auto theft. '

Finally, if the pressure of rising caseloads were forcing prosecutors into
making deals, one would expect to see some correlation between judicial
caseloads and falling sentences. In a system where the number of cases and
the number of prosecutors rise steadily while the number of judges stays
static, the crippling bottlenecks ought to occur in the courts, not at the
prosecutor's office. Yet judicial caseload seems to have no correlation to
drug sentence decreases.
In the end, it continues to seem likely to us that a collective judgment
by many front line federal sentencing actors that drug sentences are often
longer than necessary has played a role in the continuing decline in drug
sentence length. Even if we are wrong, the fact remains that the decline in
drug sentences has been largely a product of discretionary choices by judges,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and probation officers. The only unresolved
question is about the dominant motives for those choices.
V. THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF OUR FINDINGS

If we have gotten the story roughly right, what conclusions ought those
who make federal drug policy to draw? We see at least two.
First, many of those who enforce federal drug statutes have behaved as
if they think drug sentences resulting from strict application of existing
sentencing law are longer than need be. They have passed no such implicit
judgment on a variety of other commonly prosecuted offenses. When the
people charged with enforcing the law vote with their feet, as it were, for
nearly ten years, legislators and sentencing commissioners charged with
making the law have, at the very least, an obligation to pay attention. We do
not suggest, of course, that judges, prosecutors, and other front line
sentencing actors are the sole repositories of wisdom about criminal
punishment.312 As individuals, those most intimately involved in criminal
sentencing practice, or any other settled legal regime, are not necessarily
wiser or more free of parochialism or institutional self-interest than policymakers more removed from the fray. Still, our system invests federal judges,
federal prosecutors, the federal criminal defense bar, and federal probation
officers with immense collective power based in large measure on the faith
311. Bowman & Heise, supranote 1, at 1130.
312. See Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained, and Other Lessons in
Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 Wis. L. REv. 679, 709-14 (arguing that
judges do not "have unique insight into the choice of individualized sentences"); Frank 0.
Bowman, III, Fearof Law: Thoughts on Fear ofJudging' and the State of the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. Louis U. L. REv. 299, 310-26 (2000) (arguing againstjudicial hegemony over criminal sentencing).

HeinOnline -- 87 Iowa L. Rev. 558 2001-2002

REBELLIONII
that these are people of intelligence and good judgment. The emergence of
a widely-shared judgment among these trustees of the federal criminal
justice system is a fact of which Congress and the Commission must take
account in making drug sentencing policy. Thus, our results suggest, in a
general way, that Congress and the Commission should consider statutory
and/or Guidelines changes to reduce at least some federal drug sentences.
Second, even if we are wrong in ourjudgment about the collective views
of front line sentencing actors, even if one accepts the hypothesis that falling
federal drug sentences are driven primarily by workload considerations (or
some other reason unrelated to the severity of drug penalties), such a
conclusion would itself deal a crippling blow to the raison d'etre of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Before the Guidelines, U.S. Attorneys had
three basic tools to deal with caseload pressures. The first tool was
declination. U.S. Attorney's Offices are relatively small and state authorities
have concurrent jurisdiction over most offenses prosecutable in federal
court. Therefore, U.S. Attorney's Offices have customarily established
declination guidelines that kept federal investigative agencies focused on
larger, more characteristically "federal" crimes, and shunted prosecutable
but relatively minor cases to state authorities. The second tool was addition
of resources. If shifts in demographics or crime patterns caused an enduring
shift in the number of federal-quality cases in a district, the Justice
Department increased the size of the U.S. Attorney's Office. 13 The third
pre-Guidelines case management tool was sentence bargaining-reducing
case backlog by reducing the "market price" of a guilty plea.
A good portion of the point of enacting the Guidelines was to eliminate
plea bargaining outside the sanctioned limits built into the Guidelines
themselves. Unrestricted plea bargaining was thought inimical to a guideline
system because it placed in the hands of prosecutors the power to treat
similarly situated defendants differently. The Guidelines were supposed to
have eliminated sentence bargaining as a tool of prosecutorial case
management. The Guidelines' goal of creating a nationally uniform system,
in which similarly situated defendants in Maine and Miami, Seattle and San
Diego, receive substantially the same sentences, cannot be achieved if local
U.S. Attorneys are free to create idiosyncratic local sentencing policies to
respond to local conditions.
Our work demonstrates that prosecutors, and the judges they appear
before, use their discretion liberally, but irregularly, to reduce drug
sentences. Whether they do so because they see drug sentences as too high
in a moral sense, or as higher than necessary to achieve maximal deterrence,
313. A classic example occurred in the Southern District of Florida in the 1980s and 1990s.
As drug trafficking in the Caribbean region grew exponentially, the Justice Department responded first by sending dozens of temporary detailees to the Miami U.S. Attorney's Office, and
then by doubling the size of the office from around one hundred attorneys to over two hundred. Bowman joined the office during the second phase.
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or simply as a tool to facilitate rapid case resolution matters very little from
the perspective of the architects and custodians of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. From this vantage point, what matters is that prosecutors and
judges have slipped the traces of the Guidelines en masse. Many regularly
substitute their personal moral compass, or their pragmatic judgment of
what is fitting in a particular case, for the judgment expressed by the
guidelines. Many have reverted to local norms and legal folkways,
establishing sentencing practices based on Guidelines rules but full of local
idiosyncrasy. Some, like the U.S. Attorneys of the Mexican border districts,
have consciously seceded from the Guidelines regime, declaring unilaterally
that local conditions entitle them to disregard national law.
The stubborn localism of judicial and prosecutorial behavior brings us
to the third point. There will doubtless be observers who conclude that
there is nothing wrong with the rules governing drug sentencing in the
federal courts, that the penalties are set at an appropriately stringent level,
commensurate with the threat illegal drugs present to American society. To
such observers, the statistical phenomenon we document here will be seen
as proof, not of an insupportably draconian legal regime, but of a failure of
institutional control. In this view, the legislative judgments of a popularly
elected Congress, embodied in statutes and congressionally approved
Sentencing Guidelines, have been subverted. The subversion occurred in
part because the Justice Department has been unwilling to discipline United
States Attorney's Offices which persistently refuse to enforce the law. The
judiciary has also played a role. Many judges, moved by considerations of
principle or efficiency, have acquiesced in or actively encouraged
prosecutorial laxness. And many members of the judiciary have been waging
a long quiet battle to regain incrementally the authority over sentencing
they lost with the advent of the Guidelines. If one sees the situation this way,
the question is not whether or how far federal drug sentences should be
reduced, but how to reassert congressional supremacy over sentencing
policy by compelling judicial and prosecutorial compliance with a set of laws
thatjudges and prosecutors have long since become used to manipulating.
VI. CONCLUSION

In one sense, both the Articles in this series do no more than put
statistical flesh and bone and muscle on what most of us involved in federal
drug sentencing have seen in the insular worlds of the districts in which we
practice, and suspected to be true of the nation as a whole, for a long time.
Federal drug sentences in the era of Guidelines and minimum mandatory
sentences are very long and those most directly involved in imposing those
sentences have behaved accordingly. By quantifying that behavior, we hope
to focus debate on what, if anything, to do about it.
Some may see in the long, discretion-driven, regionally irregular decline
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of federal drug sentences the collapse of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
as a coherent national sentencing system. Less apocalyptically, the trends we
have described here lead to one of two conclusions. On the one hand, one
might conclude that the Guidelines have failed in their primary objective of
achieving uniformity and banishing unjustified disparity, and must either be
abandoned or their retention justified on some other ground. Alternatively,
one can see the story of drug sentences in the past decade as nothing more
than a challenge to an evolving system. In this view, the Guidelines need not
be abandoned nor their fundamental premises questioned. Rather, the
behavior of lawyers and judges sentencing federal drug offenders should be
viewed as precisely the sort of feedback that the framers of the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 imagined would lead to improvements to the Guidelines
structure. 314 From this perspective, our results call not for despair, but for a
healthy, if politically sensitive, re-examination and reform of federal drug
sentencing law and practice.
314. See Daniel J. Freed, FederalSentencing in the Wake of the Guidelines: UnacceptableLimits on
the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE LJ. 1681, 1694 (1992) (describing original vision of framers
of the Sentencing Reform Act of ongoing collaboration between judges and the Sentencing
Commission in developing the Guidelines); Douglas A. Berman, A Common Law for This Age of
FederalSentencing. The Opportunity and NeedforJudicialLawmaking 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y. REV. 93,
98 (1999) (same).
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